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ABSTRAK 
 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh Ukuran Perusahaan, 
Leverage, Dewan Komisaris Independen, Kualitas Audit, dan Kepemilikan 
Manajerial terhadap Manajemen Laba pada Perusahaan Makanan dan Minuman 
yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia 2014-2016 secara parsial maupun 
simultan. 
Penelitian ini bersifat kausalitas. Populasi dalam penelitian ini adalah 
Perusahaan Makanan dan Minuman yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia 
2014-2016. Metode pemilihan sampel menggunakan purposive sampling, 
sehingga terdapat 13 perusahaan yang dijadikan sampel. Teknik analisis data 
yang digunakan adalah analisis regresi linear sederhana dan analisis regresi 
linear berganda. 
Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa Ukuran Perusahaan tidak 
berpengaruh signifikan terhadap Manajemen Laba (nilai signifikansi 0,616). 
Leverage tidak berpengaruh signifikan terhadap Manajemen Laba (nilai 
signifikansi 0,855). Kepemilikan Manajerial tidak berpengaruh signifikan 
terhadap Manajemen Laba (nilai signifikansi 0,119). Dewan komisaris 
Independen berpengaruh positif dan signifikan terhadap Manajemen Laba (nilai 
signifikansi 0,009). Kualitas Audit berpengaruh positif dan signifikan terhadap 
Manajemen Laba (nilai signifikansi 0.011). Sedangkan secara simultan, Ukuran 
Perusahaan, Leverage, Dewan Komisaris Independen, Kualitas Audit, dan 
Kepemilikan Manajerial berpengaruh signifikan terhadap Manajemen Laba (nilai 
signifikansi 0,029). 
 
Kata Kunci: Manajemen Laba, Ukuran Perusahaan, Leverage, Dewan Komisaris 
Independen, Kualitas Audit, Kepemilikan Manajerial. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This research aims to analyze the effect of Company Size, Leverage, 
Independent Boards of Commissoner, Audit Quality, and Managerial Ownership 
on Earnings Management in Manufacturing Companies of Food and Beverage 
Sub Sector listed on IDX 2014-2016 partially and simultaneously. 
This research was a causal study research. Population of this research were 
Food and Beverage Companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange 2014-2016. 
The research used purposive sampling method in order to collect the sample and 
13 companies were selected as sample of the research. The data analysis 
techniques were simple linear regression analysis and multiple linear regression 
analysis. 
The results of the research show that Company Size has no effect on 
Earnings Management (significance value 0.616). Leverage has no effect on 
Earnings Management (significance value 0.855). Managerial Ownership has no 
significant effect on Earnings Management (significance value 0.119). 
Independent Boards of Commissioner has a positive and significant effect on 
Earnings Management (significance value 0.009). Audit Quality has a positive 
and significant effect on Earnings Management (significance value 0.011). 
Meanwhile, Company Size, Leverage, Independent Boards of Commissoner, 
Audit Quality, and Managerial Ownership simultaneously have a significant effect 
on Earnings Management (significance value 0.029). 
 
Keywords: Earnings Management, Company Size, Leverage, Independent Boards 
of Commissoner, Audit Quality, Managerial Ownership 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Problem Background 
In Indonesia, there are companies listed on Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX), and some are not listed. The companies that listed on 
IDX should prepare audited financial statements by Public Accounting 
Firm before publication. This is in accordance with Peraturan Otoritas 
Jasa Keuangan No. 29/POJK. 04/2016 on the Issuer's Annual 
Report/Public Company. Basically, all sections of the financial statements 
are important information to make decision. Nevertheless, the users of 
financial statements are more concerned on the income statement. 
Statement of Financial Accounting Concept (SFAC) No. 1. states that 
earnings information is a main focus to assess the performance or 
accountability of the management. 
In the companies, there are different interest between the owner 
(principal), and manager (agent) of the companies. There is a conflict of 
interest between the owner and the agent. As an agent, the manager is 
morally responsible to optimize the benefits of the owner by obtaining 
compensation in accordance with the contract (Sukirno, et. al, 2017). 
These differences interest cause a phenomenon called Earnings 
Management. Gumanti (2000: 104-105) stated that “The term earnings 
management occurs as a direct consequence of the efforts undertaken by 
managers in attempt to affect accounting information, especially earnings, 
for his/her own and/or company’s benefits”. Earnings management occurs 
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because of there are inbalanced of interest between the principal and agent. 
The principal is motivated to enter into a contract and endorse themselves 
with ever-increasir profitability.  
Meanwhile, the manager as an agent is motivated to maximize the 
fulfillment of economic and psychological needs, such as in obtaining 
investment, loan, or compensation contract (Salno & Baridwan,                                                                           
2000). Managers manage earnings because the level of earnings is often 
associated with management performance. The amount of bonus that will 
be received by the manager depends on the size of the earnings obtained. 
Therefore, managers often try to accentuate their achievement through the 
level of earnings. 
The large companies have special attention from external parties. It 
is because the companies with large size can generate big earnings as well. 
In addition, the company also gets value-added and easiness in getting a 
debt loan. According to Sawir (2004) “the size of the company can 
determine the level of ease of companies obtain funds from the capital 
market. The size of the company also determines the bargaining power of 
the financial contract”. The possibility of a scale effect in cost and return 
makes larger companies earn more earnings.  
Creditors as a lenders of funds in companies also make accounting 
information for maintenance of certain financial ratios, such as leverage 
(Priantinah, 2009: 99-109). In maintaining its business continuity, the 
company needs big fund. The funds can be obtained from external parties, 
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such as investors and creditors. One important factor in the financing 
element is leverage. Solvability (leverage) is illustrated to see the extent to 
which a company's assets are financed by debt compared to their own 
capital (Kasmir, 2013: 41). Leverage can be understood as an estimator of 
the inherent risk to a company. With the high leverage ratio indicates that 
the company is not solvable, its total debt is greater than its total asset 
(Kasmir, 2013: 16). 
Companies that have large debts have a tendency to violate the 
debt agreements when compared with companies that have a smaller debt 
(Mardiyah, 2005: 229-256). The companies that break the debt agreements 
potentially have a possibilities tendency such as the possibility of 
accelerated maturity, increased interest rates, and re-negotiations of debt 
agreements (Herawaty & Baridwan, 2007).  
The case of accounting fraud occured in IDX, there are the case of 
PT. Kimia Farma Tbk, PT. Indofarma Tbk, and PT. Lippo indicates the 
existence of earnings management practices that started from the detected 
manipulation of earnings. PT. Kimia Farma Tbk in 2002 indicated a 
practice of earnings management by raising earnings up to Rp.31.7 billion. 
The earnings management practice is allegedly related to the old 
management's wish to be re-elected by the government to manage the 
pharmaceutical company. PT. Indofarma Tbk in 2004 conducted earnings 
management practice by presenting earnings that raising overstated net 
profit valued at Rp28.780 billion so that the impact of valuation of 
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inventory of goods in the process higher than it should, so that cost of 
sales of the year is understated. The case of earnings management from 
Manufacturing Companies about Food and Beverage Sub Sector is PT. 
Ades Alfindo. 
The case of earnings management that occur indicates that the 
implementation of corporate governance mechanism has not been well 
implemented (Firmansyah, Pratomo, & Yudowati, 2016: 1552). A 
company is required to have corporate governance mechanisms to build a 
strong and sustainable corporate condition. Herawaty & Guna (2010) 
stated that the behavior of managers who make earnings management can 
be minimized by the implementation of good corporate governance. 
According to the Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (2006) 
corporate governance is a set of rules governing relationships between 
shareholders, managers of companies, creditor, governments, employees 
and other internal and external rights holders, or in other words a system 
that regulates and controls the company. 
Board of commissioners as the culmination of the company's 
internal management system, has a role to supervise activities. The 
proportion of independent commissioners has a fundamental responsibility 
to encourage the implementation of good corporate governance principles 
in order to perform the task of supervising and giving advice to directors 
effectively and more value-added for the company (Surjadi & Tobing, 
2016: 69). 
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The managers of the company have a better understanding about 
internal information and prospects of the company in the future rather than 
the owner of the company. When the companies have managerial 
ownership, it is expected that managers will act in accordance with the 
wishes of the principal because the manager will be motivated to improve 
their work. 
The audited financial statements that have a quality, relevance and 
reliability result conducted by qualified auditors. The auditor is 
responsible for providing high quality information which is useful for 
decision-making. Auditor quality is seen as the ability to enhance the 
quality of a financial report for the company. Auditor quality is one 
important consideration for investors to assess the fairness of a financial 
report (Pradita, 2010).  
The population used in this research is a manufacturing companies 
of food and beverage sub sector listed on IDX during 2014-2016. The 
reason of using this population is because the manufacturing companies of 
food and beverage sub sector has a fluctuating sale. At certain times, such 
as Ied Mubarak, Christmas, and New Year, the sales will increase 
compared to the ordinary day. This is often called the seasonal cycle. If the 
company experiences a seasonal cycle, then the earnings in the financial 
statements will fluctuate and have an impact on decision-making by 
related parties such as investors. Therefore, management will probably do 
 6 
 
some actions considered as earnings management to make the profits 
generated by the company remains stable.  
Based on the description, the researcher took the title "The Effect 
of Company Size, Leverage and Corporate Governance Mechanism on 
Earnings Management in Manufacturing Companies of Food and 
Beverage Sub Sector Listed on IDX 2014-2016". 
B. Problem Identification 
According to the problem background, the problem identification 
of this research are as follows: 
1. The earnings information in the income statement becomes the main 
focus of financial statement’s users. In addition, information of 
earnings is often served as the target of engineering through 
opportunistic management actions to maximize its satisfaction. 
2. The conflict between the owner and management may create the 
tendency of earnings management.  
3. The manager is motivated to maximize the fulfillment of economic 
and psychological needs. 
4. Large companies have access to acquire loan, so it able to generate 
more earnings as well. 
5. Companies that have high debt will have the tendency to break the 
debt agreement. 
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6. Some cases of earnings management in Indonesia shows that the 
companies have not fully uphold the principles of good corporate 
governance. 
C. Problem Restriction 
In order for the research to be focused on the problem and avoid 
the interpretation of undesirable results, this research focuses on the effect 
of company size, leverage and corporate governance mechanism on 
earnings management. This research used company size which measured 
by total assets of the company. Leverage is used because the size of a 
company's financial leverage affects the public's assessment of the 
condition of the company. Corporate governance mechanism in this 
research used the proxy of the independent board of commissioners, audit 
quality and managerial ownership. While, in measuring earnings 
management used discretionary accruals proxies. Population in this 
research is manufacturing company of food and beverage sub sector listed 
on IDX during 2014-2016. 
D. Problem Formulation 
Based on the problem background, the problems that can be 
formulated are as follows: 
1. How does Company Size affect Earnings Management? 
2. How does Leverage affect the Earnings Management? 
3. How does the Corporate Governance Mechanism affect the Earnings 
Management? 
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4. How does Company Size, Leverage, and Corporate Governance 
Mechanism simultaneously affect on Earnings Management? 
E. Research Objectives 
Based on the problem formulation above, the purpose of the 
research are as follows: 
1. To know the effect of Company Size on Earnings Management. 
2. To know the effect of Leverage on Earnings Management. 
3. To know the effect of Corporate Governance Mechanism on Earnings 
Management. 
4. To know the effect of Company Size, Leverage, Corporate 
Governance Mechanism on Earnings Management. 
F. Research Benefits 
The benefits of this research are expected to be useful for some 
parties, including: 
1. Theoretical Benefits 
This research is expected to contribute the research in the field 
of accounting, especially on the effect of company size, leverage, and 
corporate governance mechanism on earnings management. This 
research is expected to be a reference for similar research. 
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2. Practical Benefits 
a. For Companies 
  This research is expected to provide insight management to 
make the financial statements more transparent and not misleading, 
because the financial statements are one of the main sources of 
financial information that is important to a number of users in 
making economic decisions. 
b. For investors and potential investors 
  This research is expected to be a reference of investors and 
potential investors and other market participants in looking at the 
company's earnings that are announced as a benchmark for the 
right decision-making, investment decisions, and credit. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A. Theoretical Review 
1. Financial Statements 
The financial statements are summary of recording the 
financial transactions which occur during the relevant year. These 
financial statements are made by management in order to account for 
the duties imposed on them by the owners of the company and as a 
report to external parties of the company. The financial statements are 
the main media for the companies to communicate financial 
information to the stakeholders. According to Kartikahadi (2012) 
financial statements prepared by the management consists of: 
a. Financial Position Report or Balance Sheet. 
In the Financial Position Report or Balance Sheet, there are 
informations about assets, liabilities, and equity of a company on a 
given date. In order to manage good entities, liquidity and 
solvability of the companies can be used at a time, so that financial 
flexibility can be well understood in determining financial policy 
especially in the face of cash flow difficulties. 
b. Comprehensive Income Statement 
The Comprehensive Income Statement is reported the 
performance or results of an entity's business during a specified 
period, consists of earnings and loss, composition and details of 
income and other comprehensive expenses as long as income 
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useful for calculating or analyzing profitability, efficiency, return 
on investment, earnings per share, and forecasts about the entity's 
cash flow capability. 
c. Statement of Changes in Equity 
The Statement of Changes in Equity is reported a changes 
in the equity of an entity that occurred during a certain period. This 
report is the headline that should be reported. 
d. Cash Flow Statement 
The Cash Flow Statement describes changes in cash and 
cash equivalents at the beginning and the end of the period, details 
of the cash inflows and outflows of an entity within a certain 
period. This report is prepared to describe the amount of cash 
receipts and disbursements during a reporting period, the source of 
revenue and expenditure objectives, and the increase or decrease in 
the final cash balance over the balance of the business period. The 
sources and uses of cash flows are divided into three categories, 
consists of operating activities, investment activities, and financing 
activities. 
e. Notes to the Financial Statements 
This report serves to provide additional explanations or 
details the elements of the statement of financial position (balance 
sheet), statements of comprehensive income, statement of cash 
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flow, statement of changes in equity, or qualitative explanations to 
make the financial statements more transparent and not misleading. 
f. Financial Position Report at the beginning of the comparative 
period 
This report is presented when an entity applies an 
accounting policy retrospectively or prepares a restatement of 
financial statement items, or when an entity reclassifies items in its 
financial statements. 
The financial statements are one of the main sources of 
financial information which is important to a number of users in 
making economic decisions. According to SFAC No. 2, financial 
information will be useful if it meets the following quality 
characteristics: 
a. Relevant 
Accounting information can be said to be relevant if the 
information has the ability to influence the decision of the manager 
or other financial statement users. Relevant accounting information 
will be beneficial to investors, creditors, and other users, if the 
information can be used to evaluate the past, present and future 
events (predictive value), affirming or improving previously made 
expectations (feedback value), and the information must be 
available on time and for decision makers before they lose the 
opportunity or ability to influence the decision maker (timeliness). 
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b. Reliability 
The information can be said reliable if the information can 
describe the circumstances or events according to actual conditions 
(representative faithfulness), the information must be truth-tested 
by the same test method but by different people (verifiable), the 
information free of the element of bias (neutrality). 
c. Power of appeal and Consistency 
The information in the financial statements will be more 
useful when compared to the previous period financial statements 
of the same company, as well as with the financial statements of 
other companies in the same period. Consistency shows the use of 
the same method by the company through out the period. 
d. Cost-Benefit Considerations 
Financial accounting information will be sought to be 
presented in the financial statements, provided that the benefits 
derived from the presentation of such information exceed the costs 
required to produce it. Therefore, before presenting information, 
the benefits to be gained from such information should be 
compared against the costs that will arise. 
e. Materiality 
The information is considered material in the event of 
negligence to include or errors in recording such information in 
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influencing the user of economic decisions taken on the basis of 
financial statements. 
2. Earnings Management 
Earnings management is defined as "any action on the part of 
management that affects reported income and which provides no true 
economic advantage to the organization and may be in fact, in the 
long-term, be detrimental" (Merchant & Rockness, 1994: 79). While, 
Ayres (1994: 28) defines earnings management as an intentional 
structuring of reporting or production/investment decisions around the 
bottom line impact. It encompasses income smoothing behavior but 
also includes any attempt to alter reported income reporting 
implications. Another definition of earnings management is 
"disclosure management in the sense of purposeful intervention in the 
external reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private 
gain" (Schipper, 1989: 92). 
Based on the three definitions mentioned above, the third 
definition seems to have a more profound meaning rather than the first 
and second definitions.The first definition tends to direct that earnings 
management is an act that could jeopardize the existence of the 
organization in the future. This may not be so precise, as long as 
earnings management is not only related to the individual motivations 
of managers for personal gain, but also for the benefit of the company 
and earnings management should not be associated with manipulation. 
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Meanwhile, the second definition seems too broad and does not 
directly indicate that earnings management is done for personal gain. 
For the purposes of this research, the third definition is used as the 
basis for discussion. In this case, earnings management is always 
associated with efforts to manage income or profit for certain interests 
based on certain economic factors. 
Earnings management is a difficult phenomenon to avoid, since 
this is the impact of the used accrual basis in the preparation of 
financial statements. Discretionary accrual is an accrual component 
that allows managers to intervene in the process of preparing financial 
statements. So that, the profit reported in the company's financial 
statements does not reflect the true value or condition (Herawaty & 
Guna, 2010). 
De Angelo (1986) stated that the concept of accrual model has 
two components, namely non-discretionary and discretionary 
components. The discretionary accruals component is the part that 
allows managers to intervene. This is because managers have the 
ability to control it in the short term. This component consists of the 
assessment of receivables, recognition of future warranty expense and 
capitalization assets. On the contrary, the non-discretionary component 
accruals are determined by other factors that the manager can not 
supervise. 
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Earnings management factors proposed by Watt and 
Zimmerman (1996) in Ningsaptiti (2010) are: 
a. Bonus Plan Hypothesis 
The management of the company will choose an accounting 
method that maximizes its utility, which is a high bonus. Managers 
who provide the biggest bonuses based on earnings use an accounting 
methods that increase reported earnings. In the bonus contract, there is 
known two terms namely bogey (lowest earnings rate to get a bonus) 
and cap (highest earnings rate). If the earnings is under bogey, then 
there will be no bonus earned for manager, otherwise if the earnings 
are above the cap, then the manager also will not get an additional 
bonus. If earnings is under bogey, managers tend to reduce earnings in 
the hope of earning big bonuses in the next period, and vice versa. So, 
the managers only increase earnings if it is between bogey and cap. 
b. Debt to Equity Hypothesis 
The manager of the company who commits a breach of credit 
agreement tends to choose accounting methods that have an impact on 
increasing earnings (Sweeney, 1994). This is to keep their reputation to 
the external parties. Companies that have a high debt to equity ratio 
will encourage corporate managers to use accounting methods that can 
increase revenues or profits, causing the company difficulty in 
obtaining additional funds from creditors and even companies 
threatened to breach the debt agreement. 
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c. Political Cost Hypothesis 
The large companies has a tendency to choose an accounting 
method that can lower the earnings. This is because high earnings 
make the government will take immediate action such as: imposing 
antitrust rules, raising corporate income taxes, and so on. 
Scoot (1999) in Syukriy (1999) suggests some of the motivations 
of earnings management: 
a. Bonus Purpose 
Managers who have information on the net income of the 
company will act opportunistically to manage the earnings so as to 
maximize their bonuses based on the company's compensation plans. 
b. Political Motivations 
Earnings management is used to reduce reported earnings in 
public companies. The companies tend to reduce reported earnings due 
to public pressure that results in the government setting stricter rules. 
c. Taxation Motivation 
The motivation of tax savings becomes the most real earnings 
management motivation. Various accounting methods are used for the 
purpose of income tax savings. 
d. Change of CEO 
The CEO which approaching retirement will tend to increase 
earnings to get more bonuses. Likewise, with the CEO which is less 
 18 
 
successful in improving the performance of the company, they will 
maximize the earnings so as not to be dismissed. 
e. Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
Companies which will go public has not a market price, so they 
need to set the value of shares to be offered. This is caused the 
managers of going public companies to make earnings management to 
obtain higher prices on its shares. 
f. The Importance of Giving Information to Investors 
Information on the performance of the company should be 
submitted to the investor, so the reporting of earnings should be 
presented. The investors can assess that the company is in good 
performance. 
The pattern of earnings management according to Scoot (2000) in 
Bandi & Rahmawati (2000) can be done by: 
a. Taking a Bath 
Taking a bath occurs during re-organization such as the 
appointment of a new CEO. This technique recognizes future costs and 
current period losses, requiring management to impose future cost 
estimates as a result of higher future earnings. 
b. Income Minimization 
Conducted at the time of the company experienced a high level 
of profitability so that if the earnings future period estimated to drop 
drastically can be overcome by taking earnings period earlier. 
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c. Income Maximization 
Performed when earnings decreased. The action on income 
maximization aims to report high net income for larger bonus 
purposes. This pattern is done by the company to avoid a breach of the 
long-term debt contract. 
d. Income Smoothing 
A conducted company by way of leveling the reported earnings 
that can reduce the fluctuations in profits that are too large because 
investors generally such as a relatively stable profit. 
e. Offsetting extraordinary or unusual gains 
This technique is done by removing unusual or temporal 
earnings effects which are opposed to earnings trend. 
f. Aggressive accounting applications 
This technique are defined as misstatements and are used to 
divide earnings between periods. 
g. Timing Revenue and Expense Recognition 
This technique is done by making certain policies related to 
timing a transaction. 
Earnings management techniques according to Rahmawati & 
Qomariyah (2000) can be done with three techniques, consists of: 
a. Take advantage of opportunities to make accounting estimates. 
The manner in which management affects earnings through 
judgements against accounting estimates is among other things, 
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estimates of bad debts, estimated warranty costs, amortization of 
intangible assets, and so on. 
b. Change the accounting method. 
Changes in accounting methods used to record a transaction, 
for example: change the depreciation of the year figure to a straight-
line depreciation method. 
c. Shifts the cost or earnings period. 
The examples of engineering periods of cost or income include: 
speeding up or delaying promotional expenditures until the next 
period, delaying or accelerating delivery of products to customers, 
arranging for the sale of fixed assets that have not been used. 
3. Agency Theory 
 
The Agency Theory is the basis used to understand the issues 
of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management. Agency Theory 
leads to an asymmetric relationship between the owner (principal) and 
manager (agent), to avoid the asymmetric relationship, it needed a 
concept of Good Corporate Governance that aims to make the 
company become healthier. The implementation of Corporate 
Governance is based on agency theory can be explained by the 
relationship between management and the owners, management as the 
agent is morally responsible for optimizing the benefits of the owners 
and in return will get compensation in accordance with the contract. 
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Jensen & Meckling (1976: 305-360) stated that the agency 
relationship is a contract between the manager (agent) and the owner 
(principal). These relationships sometimes cause problems between 
agents and principals. The Principal wants a greater return on its 
investment in the company, while the agent wants a big compensation 
or incentive for its performance. 
This results in the existence of two distinct interests within the 
enterprise in which each party seeks to achieve the desired prosperity, 
resulting in an information asymmetry between management and the 
owner that can provide an opportunity for managers to make earnings 
management in order to mislead the owner about the company's 
economic performance (Sefiana, 2009). Ujiyanto & Pramuka (2007) 
stated that agency theory uses three assumptions of human nature, 
namely: (1) people are generally self-interested, (2) human beings have 
limited thinking about the bounded rationality, 3) human always avoid 
risk (risk averse). 
In particular, agency theory discusses the existence of agency 
relationships, where a principal delegate work to agent who does the 
job. The problem is that the principal can not verify whether the agent 
has done something appropriately. Then, the problem of risk sharing 
that arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes toward 
risk. 
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Agency theory implies the existence of information asymmetry. 
Asymmetry information occurs when managers have better 
understanding about internal information and future prospects than 
shareholders. The existence of such information gap, management has 
the opportunity to maximize their interests which one of them by doing 
earnings management. according to Scott (2002), there are two kind of 
asymmetry information : 
a. Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection is a type of asymmetry information  
where as one or more parties conducting a business transaction or a 
potential business transaction have more information on the other 
party.  
b. Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard is a type of asymmetry information where as 
one or more parties conducting a business transaction or a potential 
business transaction can observe their actions on the settlement of 
their transactions. Meanwhile, the other partties can not do this 
kind of work. 
4. Company Size 
Company size is basically the grouping of companies into 
several groups, including the large, medium and small companies. 
According to Husnan (2007: 45) company size is a scale used to 
classify the size of companies, and can be known in various ways, 
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among others, according to total log assets, stock market value and 
others. The size of the company seen from the value of equity, the 
value of sales or asset value (Riyanto, 2008: 313). 
The classification of company size in accordance with Undang 
undang No. 20 Tahun 2008 is divided into 4 category, namely micro, 
small, medium, and large. The criteria of company size are as follow:  
Table 1. The Criteria of Company Size 
Company 
Size 
Criteria 
Asset Sales 
Micro Maximal 50 million Maximal 300 million 
Small >50-500 million >300 million-2.5 billion 
Medium >500 million-10 billion 2.5-50 billion 
Large >10 billion >50 billion 
Company is an organization established by an individual or 
group of people or other bodies whose activities are to perform 
production and distribution in order to meet the needs of the human 
economy. The size of a company is a scale or value by which a 
company can be classified by its size, by total assets, log size, stock 
value, and so forth. Basically the size of the company is only divided 
into three categories namely large companies, small, and medium. 
Large companies have many advantages over small-sized 
companies. The first advantage is the size of the company can 
determine the level of ease of companies obtain funds from the capital 
market. Second, company size determines bargaining power in 
financial contracts. Thirdly, there is the possibility of a scale effect in 
 24 
 
cost and return making larger companies earn more earnings (Sawir, 
2004 : 101-102). Large companies have greater and wider access to 
creditors, so getting a loan will be easier because it says that the large 
company have a greater opportunity to win the competition or stay in 
the industry (Lisa & Jogi, 2013). 
Company size can be measured by its total assets. This is 
because the total assets of large companies can be simplified by 
transforming them into natural logarithms (Ghozali, 2006). Sudarmadji 
& Sularto (2007) stated that total assets are used as a proxy of 
company size with the consideration that it is relatively more stable 
than the amount of sales and market capitalization. In this research, 
company size is measured by using total assets, that can be simplified 
into natural logarithms. 
5. Leverage 
Solvency or leverage ratio is the ratio used to measure the 
extent to which the  assets of the company are financed by debt. This 
means how much debt burden borne by the company compared to its 
assets. In a broad sense, it is said that solvency ratios are used to 
measure the ability of the company to pay all its obligations, both 
short-term and long-term if the company is liquidated (Kasmir, 2008 : 
151). 
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The benefits of leverage according to Kasmir (2008 :153) 
consists of: 
a. To analyze the ability of the company's position against obligations 
to other parties. 
b. To analyze the ability of a company to meet its fixed obligations 
(such as loan installments including interest) 
c. To analyze the balance between the value of assets, especially 
fixed assets with capital. 
d. To analyze how much the assets of the company are financed by 
debt. 
e. To analyze how big corporate debt affects the management of 
assets. 
f. To analyze or measure what part of each rupiah own capital is used 
as a guarantee of long-term debt 
g. To analyze how much loan funds are immediately to be billed there 
are so many times own capital. 
Usually the use of solvency or leverage ratio is adjusted to the 
company's goals. This means companies can use the leverage ratio in 
whole or in part from each type of solvency ratio that exists. The 
overall ratio usage means that all types of ratios are owned by the 
company, while some mean the company only uses some kind of ratio 
that it deems necessary to know. The types of solvency or leverage 
ratios (Kasmir, 2008) are as follows: 
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a. Debt to Asset Ratio (Debt Ratio)  
Debt ratio is the ratio of debt used to measure the ratio of 
total debt to total assets. In other words, how much the assets of the 
company are financed by debt or how big the debt of the company 
affects the management of assets. The formula for finding Debt 
Ratio can be used as follows: 
                    
         
           
       
b. Debt to Equity Ratio   
Debt to Equity Ratio is the ratio used to assess debt with 
equity. This ratio is sought by comparing the entire debt, including 
current debt with the entire equity. The formula for finding debt to 
equity ratio can be used comparison between total debt with total 
equity as follows: 
                     
         
            
       
c. Long Term Debt to Equity Ratio   
Long term debt to equity ratio is the ratio between long-
term debt and own capital. The objective is to measure how much 
of each rupiah's own capital is used as a guarantee of long-term 
debt by comparing the long-term debt with the capital itself 
provided by the company. The formula for finding long term debt 
to equity ratio is to use the comparison between long-term debt and 
own capital, which are: 
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Long Term DER = 
            
      
       
d. Times Interest Earned Ratio 
This ratio shows the amount of guaranteed profit to pay 
interest on long-term debt. The formula for finding the times 
interest earned ratio is: 
     
                           
                              
 
e. Long Term Debt to Non Current Asset 
This ratio shows the comparison between long-term debt 
assets other than current assets. This ratio is commonly used to 
assess the solvency of the company with an average standard used 
by 50% or 1: 2. 
f. Tangible Assets Debt Covarage (TADC) 
This ratio is used to determine the ratio between fixed 
assets with long-term debt, meaning that this ratio shows each 
dollar of tangible assets used to guarantee its long-term debt.This 
ratio also indicates the ability of companies to seek new loans with 
the assurance of existing fixed assets. The higher this ratio the 
greater the existing guarantees and long-term creditors are more 
secure or secure and the greater the ability of companies to seek 
loans. This ratio is usually at least 100% or 1: 1 which is that Rp 1 
long-term debt is guaranteed by Rp 1 existing fixed assets. The 
formula for finding tangible assets debt coverage is: 
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g. Current Liabilities to Net Worth 
This ratio indicates that the loan funds that will soon be 
billed there are many times their own capital. So, this ratio is the 
ratio of current debt with own capital. The purpose of this ratio is 
to find out how much part of the capital itself is used as a guarantee 
of current debt. The smaller the ratio is the better because the 
existing capital in the company more and more large to ensure the 
current debt in the company. The lowest limit of this ratio is 100% 
or 1: 1. 
                               
  
        
 
Leverage shows how much the level of assets financed by debt. 
The level of leverage can be known through the ratio of total debt to 
total assets. Companies that have large debts have a tendency to violate 
debt agreements when compared with companies that have smaller 
debt (Mardiyah, 2005). 
The companies that break the debt agreements potentially have 
a possibilities tendency such as the possibility of accelerated maturity, 
increased interest rates, and renegotiations of debt agreements 
(Herawaty & Baridwan, 2007). Leverage is usually used to describe a 
company's circumstances or ability to use assets or funds that have a 
fixed burden to increase the income level for the owner of the 
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company. When the company has a high leverage ratio, then the 
company has a high debt value. Thus, companies with high leverage 
ratios mean a higher proportion of debt compared to the proportion of 
their assets and will tend to manipulate in the form of earnings 
management. 
6. Corporate Governance Mechanism 
According to the Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia 
(2006) corporate governance is a set of rules governing relationships 
between shareholders, managers of companies, creditor, governments, 
employees and other internal and external rights holders, or in other 
words a system that regulates and controls the company. Corporate 
governance includes the relationship between the involved 
stakeholders and the objectives of the management of the company. 
The main parties in corporate governance are shareholders, 
management, and board of directors. Other stakeholders include 
employees, suppliers, customers, banks and other creditors, regulators, 
the environment, and society. 
The benefits of corporate governance according to the Forum 
for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (2006) consists of: 
a. Improve the company performance through the creation of better 
decision-making process. 
b. Improve the operational efficiency of the company and further 
improve the service to stakeholders. 
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c. Facilitate the acquisition of financing funds cheaper so as to 
increase corporate value. 
d. Restoring investor confidence to invest in Indonesia. 
e. Shareholders will be satisfied with the company's performance as 
it will increase shareholder value and dividends. 
The basic principles of good corporate governance adopted by 
Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (2006) are as follows: 
a. Fairness 
Ensure fair and equal treatment in fulfilling the rights of 
stakeholders arising under applicable agreements and laws and 
regulations. This principle emphasizes that all parties, i.e. both 
minority and foreign shareholders must be treated equally. 
b. Transparency 
Requiring an open, accurate and timely information on all 
matters that are important to the performance of the company, 
ownership, and stakeholders. 
c. Accountability 
Describe the functions, structure, system and corporate 
organ liability so that the management of the company is done 
effectively. This principle affirms management's accountability to 
the company and its shareholders. 
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d. Responsibility  
Ensure compliance white the management of the company 
against healthy corporations and applicable laws and regulations. 
In this case, the company has a social responsibility to the 
community or stakeholders and avoids abuse of power and leads 
to business ethics while maintaining a healthy business 
environment.  
Mechanism is the way things works systematically to meet 
certain requirements. Corporate governance mechanism is a clear 
procedure and relationship between decision-making parties and those 
who exercise control or oversight of decisions. There are several 
corporate governance mechanisms that are often used in research to 
determine the effect on earnings management, consists of  Independent 
Board of Commissioners and Audit Quality. According to Rahmawati 
& Hanung (2007) the proxies of corporate governance mechanisms 
consists of increasing managerial ownership, increasing institutional 
ownership, independent commissioners and audit committee. 
a. Independent Board of Commissioners 
Independent Boards of Commissioner is a member of the 
Board of Commissioners from outside the Issuer or Public Company 
and meets the requirements as an Independent Boards of 
Commissioner in accordance with Peraturan Otoritas Jasa 
Keuangan No. 33/ POJK. 04/ 2014. Independent Boards of 
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Commissioner is a mechanism that is responsible for supervising 
and guiding the management of the company. In general, the board 
of independent commissioners is responsible for overseeing the 
performance of the company's management, and the realization of 
accountability. The duties of an independent board of 
commissioners are to supervise and advise the board of directors and 
ensure that the company has carried out the responsibilities to its 
stakeholders.  
Independent Boards of Commissioners aim to balance in 
decision-making especially in the framework of the protection of 
minority shareholders and other parties concerned. However, the 
appointment of an independent board of directors by the company 
may be made only for regulatory compliance but not intended to 
enforce Good Corporate Governance (GCG) within the company 
(Wawo, 2010). The existence of an independent boards of 
commissioner in a company may affect the integrity of a financial 
statement produced by management. If the company has an 
independent boards commissioner then the financial statements 
presented by management tend to be more integrity, because within 
the company there is a body that oversees and protects the rights of 
external parties. 
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b. Audit Quality 
Audit quality can be measured using the Public Accounting 
Firm size ( Big Four and Non Big Four). Siregar & Utama (2002) 
stated that larger companies are assumed to conduct audits that are 
more equitable than smaller Public Accounting Firm, because of the 
tendency to be more careful in conducting audits, including 
performing standard audit procedures. The auditor is responsible for 
providing high quality information that is useful for decision-
making. Big Four will tend to publish a going concern audit opinion 
if the client has a problem concerning going concern company 
(Junaidi & Hartono, 2010: 7). 
DeAngelo (1981) has theoretically analyzed the relationship 
between audit quality and the size of the Public Accounting Firm. 
He argued that a large auditor would have more clients and a total 
fee would be allocated among his clients. The research also argues 
that large auditors will be more independent, and therefore, will 
provide a higher quality of audit. Auditor size is related to audit 
quality. The large economics of scale Public Accounting Firm will 
provide strong incentives to comply with SEC rules as a way of 
developing and marketing the Public Accounting Firm's expertise 
(Dewayanto, 2011: 90). 
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The following are the names of Public Accounting Firm in 
Indonesia included in the Big Four ranks: 
1) Purwantono, Suherman & Surja affiliated with Ernst and Young 
International. 
2) Tanudireja, Wibisana & associates affiliated with Price 
Waterhouse Coopers. 
3) Siddharta and Widjaja are affiliated with Klynveld Peat 
Marwick Goeldner (KPMG) International. 
4) Osman, Bing, Satrio, and colleagues affiliated with Deloitte 
Touche and Tohmatsu. 
Research conducted by Gramling et al. (2001) stated that the 
use of industry auditor specialization may recognize earnings 
management, prediction errors and the ability to predict future cash 
flows. It means that the company’s earnings audited by the auditor 
industry specialization has more accurate prediction of future cash 
flows compared to non-industry specialist auditors. 
c. Managerial ownership 
Managerial ownership is the ownership of a company's 
shares by the management. With managerial ownership, 
management not only functions as a company manager, but also as a 
shareholder. In general, it can be stated that a certain percentage of 
managerial ownership tends to influence earnings management 
action (Boediono, 2005). According to Jensen & Meckling (1976) in 
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Indriastuti (2012) stated that earnings management can be 
minimized by aligning different interests between owner and 
management by enlarging the ownership of the company's shares by 
managerial ownership. 
Managerial ownership can align the interests of the agent 
with principal, because managers share the immediate benefits of 
decisions taken and managers who run the risk of losses arising as a 
consequence of wrong decision-making. It states that the greater the 
proportion of management ownership in the company will be able to 
unify the interests of managers with shareholders, so that the 
performance of company is better (Jensen, 1986). Managerial 
ownership can be associated with agency theory. Managers and 
shareholders will increase the value of the company, because with 
the increased value of the company then the value of his wealth as 
individual shareholders will also increase as well. 
In terms of agency theory, managerial ownership is 
considered as a solution to the problems that occur between agents 
and principals. Earnings management is largely determined by the 
motivation of managers. Different motivations will result in 
different levels of earnings management, such as between managers 
who are also shareholders and managers who are not shareholders. 
Two of these will affect earnings management, because the 
ownership of a manager will participate in determining policy and 
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decision-making on accounting methods applied to the companies 
they manage. 
B. Relevant Research 
The Research on earnings managament had been done. The 
researches as follows: 
1. Research conducted by Purnama (2017: 1-14) 
This research entitled The Effect of Profitability, Leverage, 
Firm Size, Institutional Ownership and Managerial Ownership of 
Earnings Management. Empirical Studies in Manufacturing 
Companies listed on IDX from 2010-2015. The research showed the 
following results : 
a. Profitability have a positive and significant effect on earnings 
management 
b. Firm Size and Managerial Ownership have a negative effect on 
earnings management 
c. Leverage and Institutional Ownership have no effect on earnings 
management 
The similarity between this research and the research 
conducted by Purnama are the use of independent variable in the form 
of Company Size, Leverage, Managerial Ownership and the use of 
dependent variable in form of Earnings Management (Modified Jones 
Method). The data analysis technique used Multiple Linier Regression 
Analysis. 
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The difference of research conducted by Purnama with this 
research  are the uses of independent variabel in the form of 
Profitability. While, in this research used Company Size, Leverage, 
Auditor Quality, and Managerial Ownership as an independent 
variable. The period of the research also different, the research 
conducted by Purnama used the period during 2010-2015, then this 
research 2014-2016. 
2. Research conducted by Firmansyah, Pratomo & Yudowati (2016: 
1552) 
This research entitled The Influence of Independent 
Commisioner and Audit Commitee to Earnings Management. 
Empirical Studies in Manufacturing Companies, Food and Beverage 
Sub Sector Listed on IDX 2010-2013. The research showed the 
following results : 
a. Independent Boards of Commisioner and Audit Committee has a 
simultaneously influence on Earnings Management 
b. Independent Boards of Commisioners has a significant influence 
on Earnings Management 
c. Audit Committee has no significant influence on Earnings 
Management 
The similarity between this research and the research 
conducted by Firmansyah, Pratomo & Yudowati are the use of 
independent variable in the form of Independent Boards of 
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Commissioner, the use of dependent variable in form of Earnings 
Management (Modified Jones Method), and the sample of the 
research. 
The difference of research conducted by Firmansyah, Pratomo 
& Yudowati with this research are the uses of independent variabel in 
the form of Audit Commitee. While, in this research used Company 
Size, Leverage, Audit Quality, and Managerial Ownership as a 
independent variable. The data analysis technique usedis panel data 
regression by software Eviews 8.0. Beside, in this research used 
multiple linear regression. The period of the research also different, the 
research conducted by Firmansyah, Pratomo & Yudowati used the 
periode during 2010-2013, then this research 2014-2016. 
3. Research conducted by Pradito & Rahayu (2015: 3237) 
This research entitled The Influence of Independent Boards of 
Commisioner, Firm Size, and Leverage for Earnings Management. 
Empirical Studies in Manufacturing Industry Listed on IDX 2011-
2013. The research showed the following results : 
a. Independent Boards of Commissioner, Firm Size, and Leverage 
has a simultaneously influence on Earnings Management 
b. Independent Boards of Commissioner and Firm Size has no 
influence on Earnings Management 
c. Leverage has positive and significant influence on Earnings 
Management 
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The similarity between this research and the research 
conducted by Pradito & Rahayu are the use of independent variable in 
the form of Independent Boards of Commissioner, Firm Size and 
Leverage. The use of dependent variable in form of Earnings 
Management (Modified Jones Method). 
The difference of research conducted by Pradito & Rahayu 
with this research  are the uses of independent variabel in the form of 
Audit Quality, and Managerial Ownership. The data analysis technique 
used is panel data regression by software Eviews 8.1. Beside, in this 
research used multiple linear regression. The periode of the research 
also different, the research conducted by Pradito & Rahayu used the 
periode during 2011-2013, then this research 2014-2016. 
4. Research conducted by Putri & Titik (2014: 238) 
This research entitled The Influence of Managerial Ownership, 
Leverage, and Firm Size to Earnings Management of Food and 
Beverage Companies. Empirical Studies in Food and Beverage 
Companies Listed on IDX 2008-2013. The research showed the 
following results : 
a. Managerial Ownership and Leverage has no positive and 
significant influence on Earnings Management 
b. Firm Size has no negative and significant influence on Earnings 
Management 
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c. Managerial Ownership, Leverage, Firm Size has no simultaneously 
influence on Earnings Management. 
The similarity between this research and the research 
conducted by Putri & Farida are the use of independent variable in the 
form of Managerial Ownership, Leverage, and Firm Size. The use of 
dependent variable in form of Earnings Management (Modified Jones 
Method). 
The difference of research conducted by Putri & Farida with 
this research  are the uses of independent variabel in the form of 
Independent Boards of Commissioner and Audit Quality. The data 
analysis technique used is panel data regression. Beside, in this 
research used multiple linear regression. The periode of the research 
also different, the research conducted by Putri & Titik used the periode 
during 2008-2013, then this research 2014-2016. 
5. Research conducted by Ningsaptiti (2010) 
This research entitled Analysis Effect of Company Size And 
Corporate Governance Mechanism on Earnings Management. The 
population of this research is 143 companies in the manufacturing 
sector which were listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). The 
research data were collected from the financial statement of 
manufacturing companies during 2006-2008. Based on purposive 
sampling method, there are 37 samples. The reseacrh hypotesis were 
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tested using multiple regression analysis. The research showed the 
following results : 
a. The Company Size has significant effect on Earnings Management. 
b. The Concentration of Ownership has a significant effect on 
Earnings Management. 
c. The Composition of Board Commissioners have not a significant 
effect on Earnings Management. 
d. The Auditor Industry Specialization has a significant effect on 
Earnings Management. 
e. The Audit Committee Composition have not a significant effect on 
Earnings Management. 
The similarity between this research and the research 
conducted by Ningsaptiti are the use of dependent variable in form of 
Earnings Management (Modified Jones Method) and the use of 
Multiple Regression Analysis. The difference of research conducted by 
Ningsaptiti with this research are the use of independent variable in 
form of Leverage. In this research uses natural logaritma of asset as a 
proxy to calculated Company Size, while the research conducted by 
Ningsaptiti by natural logaritma of net sales. Good Corporate 
Governance (Concentration of Ownership and Composition of Audit 
Committe), while in this research, Corporate Governance (Independent 
Board of Commisioners, Audit Quality, and Managerial Ownership). 
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 The population of this research is Manufacturing Companies 
of Food and Beverage Sub-sector listed on IDX during 2014-2016. 
While, the reseach conducted by Ningsaptiti uses population of 
Manufacturing Companies listed on IDX during 2006-2008. 
C. Conceptual Framework 
1. The Effect of Company Size on Earnings Management 
Company size is the scale used in determining the size of a 
company (Sari, 2009: 128). There are various proxies that are typically 
used to represent the size of a company, such as number of employees, 
total assets, and total sales. The large companies are more concerned 
with the community, so they are more cautious in doing financial 
reporting. Then, the companies should be report the condition more 
accurate. 
The Large companies have a special attention from external 
parties. This is because the large companies can generate big earnings 
as well. Sawir (2004) state that the size of the company can determine 
the level of ease of companies obtain funds from the capital market. 
The size of the company also determines the bergaining power of 
financial contract. 
The research conducted by Herlambang & Darsono (2015: 1-
11) show that company size has a negative and significant effect on 
earnings management. This is indicated that the larger company size, 
the less earnings management. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
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company size has a negative and significant effect on earnings 
management. 
2. The Effect of Leverage on Earnings Management 
Leverage as an estimator of the inherent risk of the company. 
When the company has a high leverage ratio, it indicates that the 
company is not solvable, its total debt is greater than its total asset 
(Kasmir, 2013: 16). Since leverage is a ratio that calculates how much 
funding the creditors provide, as well as the ratio that compares the 
total debt to the total asset of a company. If the investor sees a 
company with high assets but the risk of leverage is also high, it will 
think twice to invest at the company. Management's decision try to 
keep the leverage ratio from rising.  
The magnitude of leverage can affect the earnings management 
action. Husnan (2001) states that high leverage caused by 
mismanagement in managing corporate finance or improper 
implementation of strategy from the management. Due to the lack of 
supervision leading to high leverage, it will also increase the 
oppurtunistic actions such as earnings management to maintain the 
performance of shareholders and the public.  
Referring to the debt covenant hypothesis which states that if a 
company deviates from a debt agreement that has been made based on 
earnings, the more likely management of the company chooses 
accounting procedures that shift the accounting earnings from the next 
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period to the current period (Watt & Zimmerman, 1986) in Naftalia 
(2013). 
The research conducted by Naftalia & Marsono (2013: 1-8) 
found that leverage has a significant effect on earnings management. 
These result indicates that company with high leverage ratios mean 
higher proportion of debt compares to the proportion of assets will 
tend to manipulate in the form of earnings management. Incresead 
leverage will lead to improved earnings management practices. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that leverage has a positive and 
significant effect on earnings management. 
3. The Effect of Independent Board of Commissioners on Earnings 
Management 
Board of commissioners as the top of the company's internal 
management system have a important role in the company, especially 
in the implementation of good corporate governance. Independent 
Boards of Commissioner is a member of the boards commissioners 
from outside the issuer or public company and meets the requirments 
as an independen boards commissioners accordance with Peraturan 
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan  no. 33/POJK. 04/2014. 
According to Klein (2002) The Board of Commissioners who 
come from outside the company or outside director may influence the 
action of earnings management. Higher number of independent 
commissioners, the more controlling action that can reduce the action 
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of earnings management. Therefore, it can be conclude that 
independent boards of commissioner have a negative and significant 
effect on earnings management. 
4. The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management 
Meutia (2004) defines audits as a process to reduce the 
misalignment of information between managers and shareholders by 
using external parties to authorize the financial statements. DeAngelo 
(1981) defines Audit Quality as a combined probability for detecting 
and reporting material errors in financial statements. Audit quality is 
seen as an ability to enhance the quality of corporate financial 
reporting. With high audit quality is expected to increase the 
confidence of the investors. Audit quality is proxied by Public 
Accounting Firm Size (Big Four and Non Big Four). 
Herusetya (2009) state that when the company using the Public 
Accounting Firm (Big Four), the Audit Quality is high, then the 
Earnings Management that occurred in the company is low. In addition 
to Indonesia, Rusmin (2010) in all non-financial corporations in 
Singapore in 2003 found the Size of Public Accounting Firm 
negatively related to Earnings Management. Therefore, it can be 
conclude that audit quality has a negative and significant effect on 
earnings management. 
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5. The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Earnings Management 
Managerial Ownership is the amount of shares owned by 
company’s management. The different motivations will result in 
different levels of earnings management, such as between managers 
who are shareholders and managers who are not shareholders. A 
certain percentage of ownership by management tends to affect 
earnings management (Boediono, 2005). When the ownership of 
shares owned by the manager then the manager will act in line with the 
interests of shareholders, it can minimize the opportunist behavior of 
managers. In low stock ownership, incentives for possible 
opportunistic behavior of managers will increase (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986) in Herawaty (2008). Therefore, it can be conclude that 
managerial ownership has a negative and significant effect on earnings 
management. 
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D. Research Paradigm 
From the theoritical review and relevant research above, then in 
this research used the frame of thought as follow : 
 
Figure  1. Research Paradigm 
Information : 
  
  
 
 
 
Earnings 
Management 
(Y) 
Company Size 
(X1) 
Leverage 
(X2) 
Independent Board 
of Commissioners 
(X3)  
Audit Quality 
(X4) 
Managerial 
Ownership 
(X5) 
H6 
H5 
H4 
H3 
H2 
H1 
The effect of independent variable interaction 
partially to the dependent variable. 
The effect of independent variable interaction 
simultaneously to the dependent variable. 
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E. Research Hypothesis 
Based on the description of the critical theory and conseptual 
framework, it can be formulated the hypothesis as follow : 
1. H1 : Company Size has a negative and significant effect on 
Earnings Management. 
2. H2  : Leverage has a positive and significant effect on Earnings 
Management. 
3. H3  : Independent Board of Commissioner has a negative and    
significant effect on  Earnings Management. 
4. H4  : Audit Quality has a negative and significant effect on 
Earnings Management. 
5. H5  : Managerial Ownership has a negative and significant 
effect on  Earnings Management. 
6. H6 : Company Size, Leverage, Independent Board of 
Commissioners, Audit Quality, and Managerial 
Ownership simultaneously has a significant affect on 
Earnings Management. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
A. Types of Research 
 
This type of research is a causal associative, there is a causal 
relationship between two variables as dependent variable and independent 
variable. Causal design is useful for measuring relationships between 
research variables or useful for analyzing how one variable affects other 
variables (Umar, 2003). 
The type of data used in this research is secondary data, namely 
financial statement on manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange during 2014-2016. Secondary Data is a source of data obtained 
by researchers directly through intermediaries. Secondary data are 
generally in the form of published, unpublished evidence, records or 
historical reports (Indrianto & Supomo, 2002). 
B. The Research Schedule 
This research uses secondary data taken from The Financial 
Statements of Manufacturing Companies of Food and Beverage Sub 
Sector listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2014-2016. This 
research have been conducted in November 2017 until February 2018. 
C. Population and Sample Research 
1. Population 
According Sugiyono (2010) Population is a generalization 
region consisting of objects or subjects that have certain qualities and 
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characteristics set by researchers to be studied and then drawn 
conclusions. The population of this research is all financial statements 
from Manufacturing Companies of Food and Beverage Sub Sector 
listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2014-2016. 
2. Samples 
The samples is part of the number and characteristic possessed 
by the population (Sugiyono, 2010). Roscoe's Simple Rules Of Thumb 
state that in most ex post facto research, samples of 30 or more are 
recommended (Hill, 1998: 3-4). In this research, there are 16 
companies have been available. The samples in this research is done 
by using purposive sampling method, that is determination of sample 
based on suitability of certain characteristics and criteria. The 
characteristics and criteria are as follows: 
a. Manufacturing Companies of Food and Beverage Sub Sector listed 
in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2014-2016.  
b. Companies that publish annual financial statements for the period 
of December 31, 2014-2016 which have been audited. 
c. The company has complete data of Company Size, Leverage, 
Independent Board of Commissioners, Audit Quality, Managerial 
Ownership, and the data to detect Earnings Management (Net 
Income, Cash Flow, etc). 
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D. Operational Definition Variable 
1. Dependent Variable 
Dependent variable is the variable that influenced or which 
become result because of the independent variable (Sugiyono, 2010). 
The dependent variable in this research is earnings management 
measured through discretionary accrual proxies. Earnings management 
is a condition in which management intervenes in the process of 
preparing financial statements for external parties so as to level, raise, 
and lower earnings reporting. The measurement of earnings 
management using the discretionary accrual proxy (DAC) using the 
modified Jones model (Dechow et.al, 1995: 193-225).  
This accounting model is a recording that makes the accrual 
component easy to manipulate, and this model is used because it is 
considered the best model in detecting earnings management 
(Sulistyanto, 2008). Earnings management can be measured through 
discretionary accruals calculated by way of excluding total accruals 
(TAC) and nondiscretionary accruals (NDA). The calculation are as 
follows: 
a. Measure the total accrual by using modified Jones model. 
TAC = NIit – Cfit 
Information : 
TAC = Total Accruals 
NIit = Net Income from company i on t period 
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CFit = Operating Cash Flow from company i on t period 
b. Calculates the accruals value estimated with the OLS (Ordinary 
Least Square) regression  
TACt / TAt-1 = (β)1 (1/TAt-1) + (β)2(Δ REVt / TAt-1) + (β) 3  
(PPEt / TAt-1) + e 
Information: 
TACt  = total accruals in period t 
TAt-1  = total assets of period t-1 
(Δ)REVt = change of revenue in period t 
PPEt  = property, plan, and equipment period t 
(β)1,(β)2,(β)3  = regression coefficient 
e  = error term (Error) 
c. Calculating the nondiscretionary accruals model (NDA)  
NDTACt = (β)1 (1/TAt-1)+(β)2 [(Δ REVt - Δ RECt) / TAt-1]  
+ (β) 3 (PPEt/TAt-1) + e 
Information: 
NDTACt = non accrual discretionary in year t 
TAt-1  = total assets of period t-1 
(Δ) REVt = change of revenue in period t 
(Δ) RECt = change of accounts receivable in period t 
PPEt  = property, plan, and equipment period t 
(β)1,(β)2,(β)3 = fitted coefficient obtained from the regression 
  result on the total accrual calculation 
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e  = error term  
d. Calculating Total Accrual Discretionary 
DTACt = (TACt /TAt-1) – NDTACt 
Information: 
DTACt = total discretionary accrual year t 
TACt  = total accruals year t 
TAt-1  = total assets of period t-1 
NDTACt = non accrual discretionary in year t 
2. Independent Variables 
The independent variables in this research are Company Size, 
Leverage and Corporate Governance Mechanism. The proxies to be 
used in measuring Corporate Governance include, Independent Boards 
of Commissioner, Audit Quality, and Managerial Ownership. 
a. Company Size 
Company size can use asset benchmarks. This is because 
the total assets of companies can be simplified into natural 
logarithms (Ghozali, 2006). Company size can be calculated by:  
Company Size = Natural Log (Total Assets) 
b. Leverage 
The leverage is the ratio of  total debt of the company to the 
total assets owned by the company and showing how much the 
company depends on the creditor in the equity financing of the 
company. Leverage can be calculated by:  
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Information : 
TL  = Total debt in period – t 
TA  = Total assets in the period – t 
c. Independent Board of Commissioners 
The existence of an independent commissioner in a 
company may affect the integrity of a financial statement produced 
by management. If the company has an independent commissioner 
then the financial report presented by management tend to be more 
integrity. An Independent Board of Commissioners at least 30% 
(thirty percent) of the total members of the Board of 
Commissioners, has fulfilled the guidelines of Good Corporate 
Governance in order to maintain independence, effective and right 
decision making. The proportion of Independent Board of 
Commissioners are calculated by dividing the number of 
Independent Board of Commissioners with total members of the 
Board of Commissioners (Veronica, 2005). 
    
                 
                  
 
Information : 
IBC  = Independent Board of Commissioners 
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d. Audit Quality 
The measurement of Audit Quality in this research using 
the size of Public Accounting Firm. If the company is audited by a 
large Public Accounting Firm (Big Four) then the audit quality is 
high and if audited by Public Accounting Firm (Non Big Four) 
then the audit quality is low. Audit quality in this research is 
measured by non-metric (ordinal) data, with a value of 1 if audited 
by Big Four and 0 if audited by Non Big Four.  
e. Managerial Ownership 
Managerial Ownership is the amount of shares owned by 
management of total shares outstanding (Herawaty, 2008). In this 
research, Managerial Ownership is measured by using dummy 
variable that is value 1 for companies that have Managerial 
Ownership and value 0 for companies with no Managerial 
Ownership. 
E. Data Collection Techniques 
The data were collected using literature study method and 
documentation. Library study is done by processing literature, articles, 
journals or other written media related to the topic of discussion of this 
research. While the documentation is done by collecting the sources of 
documentary data such as the company's annual report into the sample 
research. 
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F. Data Analysis Techniques 
1. Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
Descriptive statistical analysis is provide information or 
description of data viewed from mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
and minimum (Ghozali, 2011: 19). Mean is used to know the average 
of the data concerned. Standard deviation is used to find out how large 
the data concerned vary from average. Maximum used to know the 
largest amount of data in question. Minimum is used to determine the 
smallest amount of data. 
2. Classic Assumption Test 
Classic assumption test is required to test the hypothesis by 
using multiple regression analysis. There are used : 
a. Normality Test 
The normality test aims to test whether the dependent and 
independent variables in the regression model are normally 
distributed (Ghozali, 2011: 160). One way to look at the residual 
normality is to use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov One-Sample 
statistical test. Data can be considered normal if the probability of a 
variable significance is above the 0.05 trust level. In this research to 
test data normality used One Sample Kolmogrov-Smirnov Test. In 
thistest, variables that have (probability <0.05) means that the 
variables are not normally distributed. 
 
 57 
 
b. Multicolonierity Test 
Multicollonearity test aims to test whether the regression 
model found a correlation between independent variables. A good 
regression model should not be correlated between independent 
variables. To detect the presence or absence of multicollinearity in 
the regression model can be seen from the tolerance and variance 
inflation factor (VIF). The limit value used in this study is the 
tolerance value approaching 1 or equal to the VIF value around the 
number 10. Symptoms of multicolonierity will be identified if the 
VIF is greater than 10 (Ghozali, 2011: 105-106). 
c. Heteroscedasticity Test 
The heteroskedasticity test aims to test in the regression 
model there is a variance or inequality variant of the residual one 
observation of another observation. A good regression model is no 
heteroscedicity or homocedasticity (Ghozali, 2011: 139). To detect 
the presence or absence of heteroskesdasticity, this study used Park 
Test. The basis of desicion-making in the Park Test is if the 
significance value more than 0.05 then there is no problem 
heteroscedasticity. 
d. Autocorrelation Test 
The autocorrelation test aims to test whether in the linear 
regression model there is a correlation between the confounding 
error in period t with the intruder error in period t-1 (previous). 
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Autocorrelation arises because consecutive observations over time 
are related to each other. A good regression model is one that does 
not contain autocorrelation problems (Ghozali, 2011: 110). To 
detect the presence or absence of autocorrelation by using Durbin-
Watson test (DW Test). The basis of desicion-making in the DW 
Test is if dU<d<4-dU then the regression model does not contain 
autocorrelation. 
3. Hypothesis Test 
a. Simple Regression Analysis  
The step of simple linear regression analysis are as follows: 
1) Simple Linear Regression Equation 
According to Sugiyono (2016: 247), the formula is as 
follow: 
Y’= a + bX 
Information: 
Y = Predicted Value 
a = Constant 
b = Regression Coefficient 
X = Independent Variable Value 
The equation can be constructed if the value of a and b have 
been found. This equation  is used to explain how the value of the 
dependent variable will occur if the value of independent variable 
is set. 
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2) Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
The Coefficient of Determination (R
2
) is used to measure 
the ability of the model to explaining the variation of dependent 
variable that used. The coefficient of determination (R
2
) is 
between zero and one. The small value of R
2
 means that the 
ability of the independent variables to explain the dependent 
variable is very limited. If the coefficient of determination is equal 
to zero, then the independent variable has no effect on the 
dependent variable. If the magnitude of the coefficient of 
determination close to 1, then the independent variable has a 
perfect effect on the dependent variable. Using this model, the 
minimization error is minimized so that R
2
 approaches 1, so 
regression estimates will be closer to the actual situation (Ghozali, 
2011 : 97). 
3) Significance Test with t Statistical Test 
The t statistical test or t test is used to explain how far the 
effect of one variable individually in explaining the variation of 
the dependent variable (Ghozali, 2011: 98). The basis of decision 
making in t test is by comparing the value of tcount with the value 
of ttable. If the value of tcount is equal or greater than ttable with a 
significance level of 5%, then the independent variable 
individually significantly affect the dependent variable. Besides, if 
the value of tcount is smaller than ttable with significance level of 5 
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%, the independent variable individually does not significantly 
affect the dependent variable. 
b. Multiple Regression Analysis 
The step of multiple linear regression analysis are as 
follows: 
1) Multiple Linear Regression Equation 
According to Sugiyono (2016: 253), the formula is as 
follow: 
Y’= a + b1x1 + b2x2 + b3x3 + b4x4 + b5x5 
Information: 
Y  = Earnings Management 
a  = Constant 
b1-4  = Regression Coefficient 
x1  = Company Size 
x2  = Leverage 
x3  = Independent Boards of Commissioner 
x4  = Audit Quality 
x5  = Managerial Ownership 
2) Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
The Coefficient of Determination (R
2
) is used to 
measure the ability of the model to explaining the variation of 
dependent variable that used. The coefficient of determination 
(R
2
) is between zero and one. The small value of R
2
 means that 
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the ability of the independent variables to explain the 
dependent variable is very limited. If the coefficient of 
determination is equal to zero, then the independent variable 
has no effect on the dependent variable. If the magnitude of the 
coefficient of determination close to 1, then the independent 
variable has a perfect effect on the dependent variable. Using 
this model, the minimization error is minimized so that R
2
 
approaches 1, so regression estimates will be closer to the 
actual situation (Ghozali, 2011 : 97). 
3) Simultaneous Significance Test (Test Statistic F) 
The F statistic test is used to determine whether all the 
independent variables included in the regression model have a 
simultaneous effect on the dependent variable (Ghozali, 2011 : 
98). The basis of decision making in F test is by comparing the 
value of Fcount with the value of Ftable. If the value of Fcount is 
equal or greater than Ftable with a significance level of 5%, then 
the independent variable simultaneously and significantly 
affect the dependent variable. Besides, if the value of Fcount is 
smaller than Ftable with significance level of 5 %, the 
independent variable simultaneously does not significantly 
affect the dependent variable. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
A. Description of Data 
This research used a secondary data in the form of audited 
financial statements. The financial statements are obtained from the 
official website of Indonesia Stock Exchange namely www.idx.co.id. The 
population in this research is manufacturing company of food and 
beverage sub sector listed on IDX 2014-2016. The amount is 39 
companies. The sample that used in this research is purposive sampling 
technique. Based on the criteria that have been determined, then obtained 
the number of samples of 13 companies. Here are the population and 
sample selection data: 
Table 2. Selection of Population and Sample 
No Information Amount 
1. Food and beverage companies listed on IDX 
2014- 2016. 
16 
2. The companies that do not have the necessary 
data in this research. 
(3) 
The amount of samples in 1 period 13 
The amount of samples in 3 periode (13 x 3) 39 
Source : The Result of Secondary Data. 
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Table 3.The List of Sample of the Research 
No Code 
  
Name 
 
1 AISA Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food Tbk 
2 ALTO Tri Banyan Tirta Tbk 
3 CEKA 
Wilmar Cahaya Indonesia Tbk (d.h Cahaya 
Kalbar Tbk) 
4 DLTA   Delta Djakarta Tbk 
5 ICBP Indofood CBP Sukses Makmur Tbk 
6 INDF Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk 
7 MLBI Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk 
8 MYOR Mayora Indah Tbk 
9 PSDN Prashida Aneka Niaga Tbk 
10 ROTI Nippon Indosari Corporindo Tbk 
11 SKBM Sekar Bumi Tbk 
12 SKLT Sekar Laut Tbk 
13 ULTJ 
Ultrajaya Milk Industry and Trading Company 
Tbk 
Source : The Result of Secondary Data. 
B. The Result of Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
EM 39 -1.0176 15.6532 0.605623 2.7800921 
SIZE 39 26.5271 32.1510 28.733172 1.5363777 
LEV 39 0.0002 0.7518 0.466872 0.1801127 
IBC 39 0.2000 0.4286 0.343053 0.525989 
AQ 39 0 1 0.54 0.505 
MO 39 0 1 0.54 0.505 
Valid N 39     
Source : The Result of Secondary Data. 
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a. Earnings Management 
In order to conduct the frequency distribution of Earnings 
Management, the steps were as follows: 
1) Determine the total class interval 
K= 1 + 3.3 (log n) 
K= 1 + 3.3 (log 39) 
K= 1 + 3.3 (1.59) 
K= 1 + 4.77 
K= 5.77 rounded up to K=6 
2) Determine the class range 
Class range = Maximum-Minimum 
=15.65-(-1.017) 
=16.66 
3) Determine the class interval length  
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Frequency distribution of Earnings Management could be seen 
in the table below: 
Table 5. Frequency Distribution of Earnings Management 
No Interval Frequency Frequency 
Relative 
1 -1.01-1.82 37 95% 
2 1.83-4.66 0 0 
3 4.67-7.5 0 0 
4 7.6-10.43 1 2,5% 
5 10.44-13.27 0 0 
6 13.28-16.11 1 2,5% 
7 Total 39 100% 
Source: The Result of Secondary Data 
The data of Earnings Management could be categorized on the 
following criteria bellow: 
1) High Category  = (>iM + 1 iSD) 
2) Medium Category  = (iM-1 iSD) until (iM + 1 iSD) 
3) Small Category  = (iM – 1 iSD) 
The formula to calculate Ideal Mean (iM), Ideal Standard 
Deviation (iSD), High, Medium, and Low Category are as follows: 
1) Ideal Mean (iM)  = ½(Maximum+Minimum) 
= ½(15.65-1.01) 
=7.32 
2) Ideal Standard Deviation = 1/6(Maximum-Minimum) 
=1/6(15.65+1.01) 
=2.8 
3) High Category  =>(iM+1 iSD) 
=>(7.32+2.8) 
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=>10.12 
4) Medium Category  =iM- 1 iSD until iM+ 1 iSD 
=4.52 until 10.12 
5) Low Category   =<(iM- 1 iSD) 
=<4.52 
Based on the calculation, the frequency distribution tendency 
of Earnings Management could be seen in the table bellow: 
Table 6. Tendency Category of earnings Management 
No Interval Frequency Frequency 
Relative 
Category 
1 >10.12 1 2.5% High 
2 4.52 - 10.12 1 2.5% Medium 
3 <4.52 37 95% Low 
4 Total 39 100%  
Source: The Result of Secondary Data 
Based on table 6, it shows that there are 1 sample (2.5%) in the 
high category, 1 sample (2.5%) in the medium category, and 37 
samples (95%) in the low category. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
Earnings Management in Food and Beverage Companies listed on IDX 
2014-2016 are in the low category. 
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b. Company Size 
Frequency distribution of Company Size could be seen in the 
table below: 
Table 7. Frequency Distribution of Company Size 
No Company Size Asset Frequency Frequency 
Relative 
1 Small >50-500 
million 
1 7% 
2 Medium >500 
million- 10 
billion 
9 70% 
3 Large >10 billion 3 23% 
4 Total  13 100% 
Source: The Result of Secondary Data 
 Based on table 7 , it shows that there are 3 company (23%) in 
the large category, 9 companies (70%) in the medium category, and 1 
company (7%) in the small category. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that Company Size in Food and Beverage Companies listed on IDX 
2014-2016 are dominated by companies in medium size. 
c. Leverage 
In order to conduct the frequency distribution of Leverage, the 
steps were as follows: 
1) Determine the total class interval 
K= 1 + 3.3 (log n) 
K= 1 + 3.3 (log 39) 
K= 1 + 3.3 (1.59) 
K= 1 + 4.77 
K= 5.77 rounded up to K=6 
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2) Determine the class range 
Class range = Maximum-Minimum 
=0.75-0.0002 
=0.74 
3) Determine the class interval length  
                        
      
                        
 
 
    
 
 
      
Frequency distribution of Leverage could be seen in the table 
below: 
Table 8. Frequency Distribution of Leverage 
No Interval Frequency Frequency 
Relative 
1 0.12-0.24 6 15% 
2 0.25-0.37 2 5% 
3 0.38-0.50 6 15% 
4 0.51-0.63 23 60% 
5 0.64-0.76 2 5% 
 Total 39 100% 
Source: The Result of Secondary Data 
The data of Leverage could be categorized on the following 
criteria bellow: 
1) High Category = (>iM + 1 iSD) 
2) Medium Category = (iM-1 iSD) until (iM + 1 iSD) 
3) Small Category = (iM – 1 iSD) 
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The formula to calculate Ideal Mean (iM), Ideal Standard 
Deviation (iSD), High, Medium, and Low Category are as follows: 
1) Ideal Mean (iM)  = ½(Maximum+Minimum) 
= ½(0.42+0.0002) 
=0.37 
2) Ideal Standard Deviation = 1/6(Maximum-Minimum) 
=1/6(0.42-0.0002) 
=0.12 
3) High Category  =>(iM+1 iSD) 
=>(0.37+0.12) 
=>0.49 
4) Medium Category  =iM- 1 iSD until iM+ 1 iSD 
=0.25 until 0.49 
5) Low Category   =<(iM- 1 iSD) 
=<0.25 
Based on the calculation, the frequency distribution tendency 
of Leverage could be seen in the table bellow: 
Table 9. Tendency Category of Leverage 
No Interval Frequency Frequency 
Relative 
Category 
1 >0.49 25 64% High 
2 0.25-0.49 8 21% Medium 
3 <0.25 6 15% Low 
4 Total 39 100%  
Source: The Result of Secondary Data 
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Based on table 10, it shows that there are 25 samples (64%) in 
the high category, 8 samples (21%) in the medium category, and 6 
samples (15%) in the low category. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
Leverage in Food and Beverage Companies listed on IDX 2014-2016 
are in the high category. 
d. Independent Boards of Commissioners 
Based on table 3. It can be seen that the independent boards of 
commissioners have a minimum value of 0.2000. There are 3 samples 
(8%) that have a low independent boards of commissioner (<0.3). 
Meanwhile, 36 samples (92%) have a high independent boards of 
commissioner (≥0.3). The company that has the lowest commissioner 
board is Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food in 2014-2015. Meanwhile, the 
company that owns Independent Boards of Commissioners is Multi 
Bintang Indonesia 2015 - 2016. 
e. Audit Quality 
Based on table 3. The samples that audited by Big Four are 21 
samples (54%) from 7 companies, there are Wilmar Cahaya Indonesia, 
Delta Djakarta, Indofood CBP Sukses Makmur, Indofood Sukses 
Makmur, Multi Bintang Indonesia, Prashida Aneka Niaga, and Nippon 
Indosari Corporindo. Then, 18 samples (46%) from 6 companies 
audited by Non Big Four, there are Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food, Tri 
Banyan Tirta, Mayora Indah, Sekar Bumi, Sekar Laut, Siantar Top, 
and Ultrajaya Milk Industry and Trading Company. 
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f. Managerial Ownership 
Based on table 3. The samples that have managerial ownership 
are 21 samples (54%) from 8 companies, there are Tri Banyan Tirta in 
2014-2016, Wilmar Cahaya Indonesia in 2014 and 2016, Indofood 
Sukses Makmur in 2014-2016, Mayora Indah 2016, Prashida Aneka 
Niaga 2014-2016, Sekar Bumi 2014-2016, Sekar Laut 2014 -2016, 
Ultrajaya Milk Industry and Trading Company 2014-2016. 
Meanwhile, the samples that have not managerial ownership are 18 
samples (46%) from 7 companies, there are Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food 
2014-2016, Wilmar Cahaya Indonesia 2015, Delta Djakarta 2014-
2016, Indofood CBP Sukses Makmur 2014-2016, Multi Bintang 
Indonesia 2014-2016, Mayora Indah 2014-2015, and Nippon Indosari 
Corporindo 2014-2016. 
C. The Result of Classic Assumption Test 
The Classic Assumption Test used in this research are as follows : 
1. Normality Test 
In this research, normality test is done by looking the value of 
Asymp. Sig (2 tailed) using Kolmogorov-Smirnov Npar Test. The 
result is as follow : 
Table 10. The Result of Normality Test 
Variable Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov 
Asymp. Sig. (2 
tailed) 
Conclusion 
Unstandardized 
Residual 0.132 0.087 Normal 
Source : The Result of Secondary Data. 
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Based on table 4, can be seen that the significance value of 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov is 0.087. The value is greater than 0.05, so it can 
be concluded that the data in this research is normally distributed. 
2. Multicollinearity Test 
Table 11. The Result of Multicollinearity Test 
Variables Tolerance VIF Conclusion 
SIZE (X1) 0.861 1.161 There’s no multicollinearity 
LEV (X2) 0.692 1.445 There’s no multicollinearity 
IBC (X3) 0.740 1.351 There’s no multicollinearity 
AQ (X4) 0.780 1.282 There’s no multicollinearity 
MO (X5) 0.749 1.336 There’s no multicollinearity 
Source : The Result of Secondary Data. 
Based on table 5, can be seen that the tolerance value and VIF 
of Company Size (SIZE) are 0.861 and 1.161. Leverage (LEV) are 
0.692 and 1.445. Independent Boards of Commissioner are 0.740 and 
1.351. Audit Quality are 0.780 and 1.282, and Managerial Ownership 
are 0.749 and 1.336. The tolerance value of all independent variables 
are greater then 0.10 and the VIF value are less than 10, so it can be 
concluded that the regression model in this research does not have 
multicollinearity. 
3. Heteroscedasticity Test 
Table 12. The Result of Heteroscedasticity Test 
Variables Sig. Conclusion 
SIZE (X1) 0.676 There’s no heteroscedasticity 
LEV (X2) 0.806 There’s no heteroscedasticity 
IBC (X3) 0.065 There’s no heteroscedasticity 
AQ (X4) 0.224 There’s no heteroscedasticity 
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MO (X5) 0.953 There’s no heteroscedasticity 
Source : The Result of Secondary Data. 
The result of Heteroscedasticity Test through Park Test can be 
seen in table 6. Based on the table, the significance value of all 
variables are greater than 0.05. This shows that the regression model 
does not contain heterocedasticity problem. 
4. Autocorrelation Test 
Table 13. The Result of Autocorrelation Test 
Model Durbin-Watson Conclusion 
1 2.049 There’s no autocorrelation 
Source : The Result of Secondary Data. 
Based on table 7, it shows that the Durbin-Watson (DW) value 
is 2.049. The DW value is compared to the dU and 4- dU values that 
found in the DW table. The value of dU with N is 39 and k = 5, so that 
dU is obtained at 1.7886. The decision is made under the terms dU <d 
<4-dU or 1.788 <2.049 <2.211. This results can be concluded that this 
regression model does not contain autocorrelation. 
D. The Result of Hypothesis Test 
1. The Result of First Hypothesis 
H1 : Company Size has a negative and significant effect on Earnings 
Management. 
Table 14. The Result of First Hypothesis Test 
Variable Constant Coefficient Value of R Value of T 
R
2 
Adj.R
2 
Tcount Ttable Sig. 
X1 Y -2.058 0.037 0.007 -0.020 0.506 1.684 0.616 
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Source : The Result of Secondary Data. 
a. Simple Linier Regression Equation 
Based on table 8, the equation of the first hypothesis (H1) 
for simple linear regression is as follow :  
EM = -2.058+0.037 SIZE 
Based on the regression equation, it can be seen that if 
Company Size (SIZE) is considered constant, the Earnings 
Management (EM) value is -2.058. Meanwhile, it can be seen that 
the regression coefficient is positive, that is equal to 0.037. It show 
if SIZE increase by 1 point, then the EM will increase by 0.037 
point with the assumption that other factors are considered 
constant. Consequently, it can be concluded that the SIZE (X1) has 
a positive effect on EM (Y). 
b. Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
Based on table 8, it can be seen that the coefficient of 
determination (R
2
) is 0.007. This value indicates that 0.7 % 
variance that happened on Earnings Management is effected by 
Company Size variable. Meanwhile, 99.3 % is effected by other 
factors. 
c. Significance Test with t Statistical Test 
Based on table 8, it can be seen that the tcount is 0.506. If 
this value compared with the ttable at the level of significance 5% 
that is 1.684. Then, the value of tcount is smaller than ttable 
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(0.506<1.684). The significance value is 0.616, this is more than 
0.05. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no significant 
effect between Company Size with Earnings Management. 
Based on the result of hypothesis testing, it can be concluded 
that Company Size has no significant effect on Earnings Management. 
Consequently, the first hypothesis that stating that “Company Size has 
a negative and significant effect on Earnings Management” is rejected. 
2. The Result of Second Hypothesis Test 
H2 : Leverage has a positive and significant effect on Earnings 
Management. 
Table 15. The Result of Second Hypothesis Test 
Variable Constant Coefficient Value of R Value of T 
R
2 
Adj. R
2 
Tcount Ttable Sig. 
X2 Y -1.015 -0.022 0.001 -0.026 -0.184 1.684 0.855 
Source : The Result of Secondary Data. 
a. Simple Linier Regression Equation 
Based on table 9, the equation of the second hypothesis 
(H2) for simple linear regression is as follow :  
EM = -1.015- 0.022 LEV 
Based on the regression equation, it can be seen that if 
Leverage (LEV) is considered constant, the Earnings Management 
(EM) value is -1.015. Meanwhile, it can be seen that the regression 
coefficient is negative, that is equal to -0.022. It show if LEV 
increase by 1 point, then the EM will decrease by 0.022 point with 
the assumption that other factors are considered constant. 
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Consequently, it can be concluded that the LEV (X2) has a 
negative effect on EM  (Y). 
b. Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
Based on table 9, it can be seen that the coefficient of 
determination (R
2
) is 0.001. This value indicates that 0.1 % 
variance that happened on Earnings Management is effected by 
Leverage variable. Meanwhile, 99.9 % is effected by other factors. 
c. Significance Test with t Statistical Test 
Based on table 9, it can be seen that the tcount is -0.184. If 
this value compared with the ttable at the level of significance 5% 
that is 1.684. Then, the value of tcount is smaller than ttable (-
0.184<1.684). The significance value is 0.855, this is more than 
0.05. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no significant 
effect between Leverage with Earnings Management. 
Based on the result of hypothesis testing, it can be concluded 
that Leverage has no significant effect on Earnings Management. 
Consequently, the second hypothesis that stating that “Leverage has a 
positive and significant effect on Earnings Management” is rejected. 
3. The Result of Third Hypothesis Test 
H3 : Independent Board of Commissioners has a negative and 
significant effect on Earnings Management. 
 
 77 
 
Table 16. The Result of Third Hypothesis Test 
Variable Constant Coefficient Value of R Value of T 
R
2 
Adj. R
2 
Tcount Ttable Sig. 
X3 Y 0.726 3.673 0.171 0.148 2.759 1.684 0.009 
Source : The Result of Secondary Data. 
a. Simple Linier Regression Equation 
Based on table 10, the equation of the third hypothesis (H3) 
for simple linear regression is as follow :  
EM = 0.726+ 3.673 IBC 
Based on the regression equation, it can be seen that if 
Independent Boards of Commissioners (IBC) is considered 
constant, the Earnings Management (EM) value is 0.726. 
Meanwhile, it can be seen that the regression coefficient is 
positive, that is equal to 3.673. It show if IBC  increase by 1 point, 
then the EM will increase by 3.673 point with the assumption that 
other factors are considered constant. Consequently, it can be 
concluded that the IBC (X3) has a positive effect on EM (Y). 
b. Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
Based on table 10, it can be seen that the coefficient of 
determination (R
2
) is 0.171. This value indicates that 17.1 % 
variance that happened on Earnings Management is effected by 
Independent Boards of Commissioner variable. Meanwhile, 82.9 % 
is effected by other factors. 
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c. Significance Test with t Statistical Test 
Based on table 10, it can be seen that the tcount is 2.759. If 
this value compared with the ttable at the level of significance 5% 
that is 1.684. Then, the value of tcount is greather than ttable 
(2.785>1.684). The significance value is 0.009, this is less than 
0.05. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a significant effect 
between Independent Boards of Commissioner with Earnings 
Management. 
Based on the result of hypothesis testing, it can be concluded 
that Independent Boards of Commissioner has a positive and 
significant effect on Earnings Management. Consequently, the third 
hypothesis that stating that “Independent Boards of Commisioner has a 
negative and significant effect on Earnings Management” is rejected. 
4. The Result of Fourth Hypothesis Test 
H4 : Audit Quality has a negative and significant effect on Earnings 
Management. 
Table 17. The Result of Fourth Hypothesis Test 
Variable Constant Coefficient Value of R Value of T 
R
2 
Adj. R
2 
Tcount Ttable Sig. 
X4 Y -1.294 0.541 0.161 0.139 2.669 1.684 0.011 
Source : The Result of Secondary Data. 
a. Simple Linier Regression Equation 
Based on table 11, the equation of the fourth hypothesis 
(H4) for simple linear regression is as follow :  
EM = -1.294+ 0.541 AQ 
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Based on the regression equation, it can be seen that if 
Audit Quality (AQ) is considered constant, the Earnings 
Management (EM) value is -1.294. Meanwhile, it can be seen that 
the regression coefficient is positive, that is equal to 0.541. It show 
if companies that audited by Big four, then the EM will increase by 
0.541 point with the assumption that other factors are considered 
constant. Consequently, it can be concluded that the AQ (X4) has a 
positive effect on EM (Y). 
b. Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
Based on table 11, it can be seen that the coefficient of 
determination (R
2
) is 0.161. This value indicates that 16.1 % 
variance that happened on Earnings Management is effected by 
Audit Quality variable. Meanwhile, 83.9 % is effected by other 
factors. 
c. Significance Test with t Statistical Test 
Based on table 11, it can be seen that the tcount is 2.669. If 
this value compared with the ttable at the level of significance 5% 
that is 1.684. Then, the value of tcount is greather than ttable 
(2.669>1.684). The significance value is 0.011, this is less than 
0.05. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a significant effect 
between Audit Quality with Earnings Management. 
Based on the result of hypothesis testing, it can be concluded 
that Audit Quality has a positif and significant effect on Earnings 
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Management. Consequently, the fourth hypothesis that stating that 
“Audit Quality has a negative and significant effect on Earnings 
Management” is rejected. 
5. The Result of Fifth Hypothesis Test 
H5 : Managerial Ownership has a negative and significant effect on 
Earnings Management.  
Table 18. The Result of Fifth Hypothesis Test 
Variable Constant Coefficient Value of R Value of T 
R
2 
Adj. R
2 
Tcount Ttable Sig. 
X5 Y -0.818 -0.342 0.065 0.039 -1.598 1.684 0.119 
Source : The Result of Secondary Data. 
a. Simple Linier Regression Equation 
Based on table 12, the equation of the fifth hypothesis (H5) 
for simple linear regression is as follow :  
EM = -0.818- 0.342 MO 
Based on the regression equation, it can be seen that if 
Managerial Ownership (MO) is considered constant, the Earnings 
Management (EM) value is -0.818. Meanwhile, it can be seen that 
the regression coefficient is negative, that is equal to -0.342. It 
show if MO increase by 1 point, then the EM will decrease by 
0.342 point with the assumption that other factors are considered 
constant. Consequently, it can be concluded that the MO (X5) has 
a negative effect on EM (Y). 
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b. Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
Based on table 12, it can be seen that the coefficient of 
determination (R
2
) is 0.065. This value indicates that 6.5 % 
variance that happened on Earnings Management is effected by 
Managerial Ownership variable. Meanwhile, 93.5 % is effected by 
other factors. 
c. Significance Test with t Statistical Test 
Based on table 12, it can be seen that the tcount is -1.598. If 
this value compared with the ttable at the level of significance 5% 
that is 1.684. Then, the value of tcount is smaller than ttable (-
1.598<1.684). The significance value is 0.119, this is more than 
0.05. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no a significant 
effect between Managerial Ownership with Earnings Management. 
Based on the result of hypothesis testing, it can be concluded 
that Managerial Ownership has no a significant effect on Earnings 
Management. Consequently, the fifth hypothesis that stating that 
“Managerial Ownership has a negative and significant effect on 
Earnings Management” is rejected. 
6. The Result of Sixth Hypothesis Test 
H6 : Company Size, Leverage, Independent Board of Commissioners, 
Audit Quality, and Managerial Ownership simultaneously has a  
significant affect on Earnings Management. 
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Table 19. The Result of Sixth Hypothesis Test 
Variable Constant Coefficient Value of R Value of F 
R
2 
Adj. R
2 
Fcount Ftable Sig. 
X1 
Y 1.425 
-0.023 
0.304 0.199 2.887 2.500 0.029 
X2 0.154 
X3 3.497 
X4 0.282 
X5 -0.360 
Source : The Result of Secondary Data. 
a. Multiple Linier Regression Equation 
Based on table 13, the equation of the sixth hypothesis (H6) 
for multiple linear regression is as follow :  
EM = 1.425- 0.023 SIZE + 0.154 LEV + 3.497 IBC + 0.282 AQ -
0.360 MO 
Based on the regression equation, it can be seen that : 
1) The constant value is 1.425, it shows that the Earnings 
Management value is 1.425 if all the independent variables are 
cosidered constant. 
2) When the Company Size (X1) increase by 1 point, then the 
Earnings Management will decrease by 0.023 point with the 
assumption that other independent variables are considered 
constant. 
3) When the Leverage (X2) increase by 1 point, then the Earnings 
Management will increase by 0.154 point with the assumption 
that other independent variables are considered constant. 
4) When the Independent Boards of Commisioners (X3) increase 
by 1 point, then the Earnings Management will increase by 
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3.497 point with the assumption that other independent 
variables are considered constant. 
5) When the company audited by Big Four, then the Earnings 
Management will increase by 0.282 point with the assumption 
that other independent variables are considered constant. 
6) When the company has a Managerial Ownership (X5), then the 
Earnings Management will decrease by 0.360 point with the 
assumption that other independent variables are considered 
constant. 
b. Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
Based on table 13, it can be seen that the coefficient of 
determination (R
2
) is 0.304. This value indicates that 30.4 % 
variance that happened on Earnings Management is effected by 
Company Size, Leverage, Independent Boards of Commisioner, 
Audit Quality and Managerial Ownership variable. Meanwhile, 
69.6 % is effected by other factors. 
c. Significance Test with F Statistical Test 
Based on table 13, it can be seen that the Fcount is 2.887. If 
this value compared with the Ftable at the level of significance 5% 
that is 2.500. Then, the value of Fcount is greather than Ftable 
(2.887>2.500). The significance value is 0.029, this is less than 
0.05. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a significant effect 
between Company Size, Leverage, Independent Boards of 
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Commissioner, Audit Quality, and  Managerial Ownership with 
Earnings Management. 
Based on the result of hypothesis testing, it can be 
concluded that Company Size, Leverage, Independent Board of 
Commissioner, Audit Quality, and Managerial Ownership has a 
significant effect on Earnings Management. Consequently, the 
sixth hypothesis that stating that “Company Size, Leverage, 
Independent Board of Commissioner, Audit Quality, and 
Managerial Ownership has a significant effect on Earnings 
Management” is accepted. 
E. Discussion 
1. The Effect of Company Size on Earnings Management 
The first hypothesis in this research is Company Size has a 
negative and significant effect on Earnings Management. Based on the 
hypothesis testing, it can be seen that the value of regression 
coefficient is 0.037. Then, the value of tcount is 0.506 which smaller 
than ttable of  1.684. The significance value is 0.616, greather than 0.05. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that the SIZE (X1) has no 
significant effect on the EM (Y). 
Based on the results of the research, the company size 
measured by natural logarithm of total assets does not affect on 
earnings management. It shows that company size may not necessarily 
increase or decrease the possibility of earnings management. Lusi 
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(2014: 20) stated that the strict supervision from the government, 
analysts, and investors will prevent manager from doing earnings 
management. Investor in decision-making not only focus on company 
size, but also on the other aspect, such as profits and future business 
prospects. There are other criteria that can be used as a proxy of company 
size, such as  stock market value, equity, and sales (Riyanto, 2008: 313). 
Based on the data, Company Size in Food and Beverage Companies listed 
on IDX 2014-2016 are dominated by companies in medium size (70%). It 
may cause company size have no effect on earnings management. 
Research’s result is inconsistent with research conducted by 
Herlambang & Darsono (2015: 1-11) and Purnama (2017) which shows 
that firm size has a negative and significant effect on earnings 
management. It indicates that the larger the company size, the less 
earnings management. Bigger company will be more strict to supervise its 
internal control. Thus, it can minimize the company's management actions 
in doing fraud regarding earnings information. 
The results of this research support the research conducted by 
Astuti, Nuraina & Wijaya (2017: 501-504), and Setyaningtyas & 
Hadiprajitno (2015: 3237) which found that company size has no 
effect on earnings management. In addition, research conducted by 
Pradito & Rahayu (2015) also found that company size has no effect 
on earnings management. 
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2. The Effect of Leverage on Earnings Management 
The second hypothesis in this research is Leverage has a 
positive and significant effect on Earnings Management. Based on the 
hypothesis testing, it can be seen that the value of regression 
coefficient is -0.022. Then, the value of tcount is -0.184 which smaller 
than ttable of  1.684. The significance value is 0.855, greather than 0.05. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that the LEV (X2) has no 
significant effect on EM (Y). 
The results of this research indicate that leverage has no effect 
on earnings management. This shows that the high or low leverage 
does not encourage management to make earnings management. The 
large or small leverage can not determine the existence of earnings 
management in food and beverage companies. This research indicate 
that the average of leverage owned by each company is low (0.466). It 
show that 46 % of total assets of the company financed by debt, and 54 
% of the assets financed by equity. Total debt of company is still able 
to be covered by companies’s asset. It may cause leverage have no 
effect on earnings management. 
This research is inconsistent with several researches such as 
Astuti, Nuraina & Wijaya (2017), Pradito & Rahayu (2015), and 
Naftalia & Marsono (2013: 1-8) which found that leverage has a 
positive and significant effect on earnings management. These results 
indicate that company with high leverage ratios means higher 
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proportion of debt compared to the proportion of assets will tend to 
manipulate in the form of earnings management. The increase of 
leverage will lead to improve earnings management practices. 
Management will create policies that can increase revenue, for 
example to improve its bargaining position when negotiating debt or to 
get funds from creditors or investors. 
This research supports the research conducted by Putri & Titik 
(2014: 238) and Jao & Pagalung (2011) which found that leverage has 
no significant effect on earnings management. 
3. The Effect of Independent Boards of Commissioner on Earnings 
Management 
The third hypothesis in this research is Independent Boards of 
Commissioner has a negative and significant effect on Earnings 
Management. Based on the hypothesis testing, it can be seen that the 
value of regression coefficient is 3.673. Then, the value of tcount is 
2.759 which greather than ttable of  1.684. The significance value is 
0.009, smaller than 0.05. Consequently, it can be concluded that the 
IBC (X3) has a positive and significant effect on EM (Y). 
The results of this research indicate that the larger the number 
of independent commissioners of the company, it can improve 
earnings management. It is because the greater the independent board 
of commissioners will cause the decline in supervisory functions and 
can disrupt them in decision-making. 
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This reseacrh is inconsistent with research conducted by 
Herlambang & Darsono (2015: 1-11), Nabila & Daljono (2013: 1-10), 
and Prastiti & Meiranto (2013: 1-12) that independent board of 
commissioners have a negative and significant impact on earnings 
management. This research supports the research conducted by 
Prabowo (2014) which states that independent commissioners have a 
positive and significant impact on earnings management. 
4. The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management 
The fourth hypothesis in this research is Audit Quality has a 
negative and significant effect on Earnings Management. Based on the 
hypothesis testing, it can be seen that the value of regression 
coefficient is 0.541. Then, the value of tcount is 2.669 which greather 
than ttable of  1.684. The significance value is 0.011, smaller than 0.05. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that the AQ (X4) has a positive and 
significant effect on EM (Y). 
The results of this research indicate that the audit quality has a 
positive and significant impact on earnings management. It show that 
the companies audited by the Big Four are indicating of greater 
earnings management compared to companies audited by Non Big 
Four. In fact, companies audited by the Big Four do not prove capable 
of limiting the company's earnings management practices (Luhgiatno, 
2010: 15-31). Ardiati (2003) found that Big Five clients reported 
higher amounts of discretionary accruals than Non Big Five clients.  
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According to Ardiati (2003: 408-426), the audit of financial statements 
is not intended to detect the occurrence of earnings management, but 
the audit is conducted to improve the credibility of financial 
statements. 
This research is inconsistent with the research conducted by 
Iswara (2017) and Rahadi & Asyik (2017) which found that the Audit 
Quality had a negative and significant impact on earnings 
management. When a company is audited by the Big Four, then 
earnings management will be low. Iswara (2017) states that a 
structured audit process can find misstatements or fraud committed by 
management. Audit activities conducted by Public Accounting Firm 
can minimize the occurrence of earnings management. This research 
supports the research conducted by Fitria (2013) and Ardiati (2003: 
408-426) which states that the quality of auditors has a positive and 
significant effect on earnings management. 
5. The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Earnings Management 
The fifth hypothesis in this research is Managerial Ownership 
has a negative and significant effect on Earnings Management. Based 
on the hypothesis testing, it can be seen that the value of regression 
coefficient is -0.342. Then, the value of tcount is -1.598 which greather 
than ttable of  1.684. The significance value is 0.119, greather than 0.05. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that the MO (X5) has a no 
significant effect on EM (Y). 
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The results of this research indicate that managerial ownership 
has no effect on earnings management. Earnings Management is 
determined by the motivation of management. The different 
motivations will produce a different amounts of earnings management. 
When viewed from the data used in this research, it is known that the 
concentration of share ownership by manageris to little. It causes 
managerial ownership to have no significant effect on earnings 
management. 
This research is inconsistent with research conducted by 
Mahariana & Ramantha (2014: 519-528) which found that Managerial 
ownership negatively affects earnings management. These results 
prove that an increase in share ownership by managers within the 
company will be able to create optimum company performance and 
motivate managers to act more cautiously, as they share the 
consequences of every action they take. This research supports the 
research conducted by Putri & Titik (2014: 238) which found that 
managerial ownership has no effect on earnings management. 
6. The Effect of Company Size, Leverage, Independent Boards of 
Commissioners, Audit Quality, and Managerial Ownership on 
Earnings Management 
The sixth hypothesis in this research is Company Size, 
Leverage, Independent Boards of Commissioners, Audit Quality, and 
Managerial Ownership simultaneously has a significant effect on 
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Earnings Management. Based on the hypothesis testing, it can be seen 
that the value of coefficient of determination value is 0.199 or 19.9%. 
This value indicates that only 19.9% the dependent variable was 
explained by the independent variable. Meanwhile, 80.1% is affected 
by other factors. 
The value of Fcount is 2.887 which greather than Ftable of 2.500. 
The significance value is 0.029, smaller than 0.05. Consequently, it 
can be concluded that Company Size, Leverage, Independent Boards 
of Commissioner, Audit Quality, and Managerial Ownership 
simultaneously has a significant effect on Earnings Management 
F. Research Limitation 
This research has been done with scientific procedures, but still has 
limitations. This research only has a vulnerable time of 3 years in 2014-
2016. In addition, the sample of this research also focused only on food 
and beverage companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
A. Conclusions 
Based on the result of research and the discussion in the previous 
chapter, the conclusions are as follows: 
1. Company Size has no a significant effect on Earnings Management. 
This result shows that company size may not necessarily increase or 
decrease the possibility of earnings management. The company size is 
not the only consideration for investors in decisions-making. However, 
there are any other important factors to consider in making investment 
decisions, such as the profits of the company and future business 
prospects. 
2. Leverage has no significant effect on Earnings Management. This 
result shows that high or low leverage does not encourage management 
to make earnings management. The companies that have a large or 
small leverage can not determine the existence of earnings 
management in food and beverage companies. Based on statistical data 
of leverage from this research indicate that the average of leverage 
owned by each company is low, so total debt of company still able to 
be covered by their asset. 
3. Independent Boards of Commisioner has a positive and significant 
effect on Earnings Management. This result show that the greater the 
independent board of commissioners will cause the decline in 
supervisory functions and can disrupt them in decisions-making. 
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4. Audit Quality has a positive and significant effect on Earnings 
Management. This result shows that companies audited by the Big 
Four are indicative of greater earnings management compared to 
companies audited by the Non Big Four. Public Accounting Firm (Big 
Four) do not prove to be able to limit the company's earnings 
management practices. 
5. Managerial Ownership has no significant effect on Earnings 
Management. This result shows that the management that owns the 
company's shares can make various efforts so as to increase the bonus 
motivation and impact on the increasing of earnings management. 
6. Company Size, Leverage, Independent Boards of Commissioner, Audit 
Quality, and Managerial Ownership simultaneously has a significant 
effect on Earnings Management. The value of Fcount is 2.882 is greather 
than Ftable which is 2.500. Then, the significance value is 0.029. Its 
smaller than 0.05. 
B. Suggestions 
1. For Futher Researcher 
a. The next researcher is suggested to expand the sample, not only in 
food and beverage companies, but in other manufacturing sectors, 
as well as adding a longer period.  
b. Next researcher may focus on the other internal aspects 
(information asymmetry, bonus compensation, and audit 
committee) and external aspect (institutional ownership), as well as 
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using other proxies of company size (net sales and the value of 
equity), and the proxy of leverage (debt to equity). 
2. For Companies 
Companies is suggested to implement Good Corporate 
Governance, in order to have a good system that oversees and controls 
the company. The Boards of Directors should provide better 
supervision. 
3. For Investor and Potential Investor 
Investors and potential investors should be more careful in using 
the financial statements to make economic decisions, not only to pay 
attention in terms of assets but also other aspects such as liabilities and 
equity of the company. Investor should encourage the Independent 
Boards of Commissioner to perform its function effectively, not only 
put their name in the structure. 
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Appendix 1. The Criteria of Company Size 
Company Size 
Criteria 
Asset Sales 
Micro Maximal 50 million Maximal 300 million 
Small >50-500 million >300 million-2.5 billion 
Medium >500 million-10 billion 2.5-50 billion 
Large >10 billion >50 billion 
 
Appendix 2. Selection Sample of the Research 
No Information Amount 
1. Food and beverage companies listed on IDX 2014- 
2016. 
16 
2. The companies that do not have the necessary data in 
this research. 
(3) 
The amount of samples in 1 period 13 
The amount of samples in 3 periode (13 x 3) 39 
 
Appendix 3. The List of Sample of the Research 
No Code 
Name 
    
1 AISA Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food Tbk 
2 ALTO Tri Banyan Tirta Tbk 
3 CEKA Wilmar Cahaya Indonesia Tbk (d.h Cahaya Kalbar Tbk) 
4 DLTA   Delta Djakarta Tbk 
5 ICBP Indofood CBP Sukses Makmur Tbk 
6 INDF Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk 
7 MLBI Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk 
8 MYOR Mayora Indah Tbk 
9 PSDN Prashida Aneka Niaga Tbk 
10 ROTI Nippon Indosari Corporindo Tbk 
11 SKBM Sekar Bumi Tbk 
12 SKLT Sekar Laut Tbk 
13 ULTJ Ultrajaya Milk Industry and Trading Company Tbk 
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Appendix 4. The Data of the Research 
No Period Code EM SIZE LEV IBC AQ MO 
1 2014 AISA 0.012 29.629 0.515  0.2   0 0 
2 2015 0.006 29.835 0.562  0.2  0 0 
3 2016 0.049 29.856 0.539  0.2  0 0 
4 2014 
ALTO 
0.026 27.845 0.570  0.3  0 1 
5 2015 0.046 27.797 0.570  0.3  0 1 
6 2016 -0.018 27.784 0.587  0.3  0 1 
7 2014 
CEKA 
1.426 27.881 0.581  0.3  1 1 
8 2015 15.653 28.027 0.569  0.3  1 0 
9 2016 0.018 27.986 0.377  0.3  1 1 
10 2014 
DLTA   
0.182 27.623 0.000  0.4  1 0 
11 2015 -0.119 27.669 0.000  0.4  1 0 
12 2016 -0.032 27.812 0.000  0.4  1 0 
13 2014 
ICBP 
-0.074 30.846 0.418  0.4  1 0 
14 2015 -0.025 30.910 0.383  0.3  1 0 
15 2016 1.257 30.995 0.360  0.3  1 0 
16 2014 
INDF 
-0.050 32.085 0.520  0.4  1 1 
17 2015 -0.018 32.151 0.530  0.4  1 1 
18 2016 -0.023 32.040 0.465  0.4  1 1 
19 2014 
MLBI 
-1.018 28.433 0.752  0.4  1 0 
20 2015 7.570 28.373 0.635  0.4  1 0 
21 2016 0.211 28.453 0.639  0.4  1 0 
22 2014 
MYOR 
0.152 29.962 0.602  0.4  0 0 
23 2015 -0.115 30.060 0.542  0.4  0 0 
24 2016 0.121 30.190 0.515  0.4  0 1 
25 2014 
PSDN 
-0.142 27.154 0.390  0.3  1 1 
26 2015 0.019 27.154 0.477  0.3  1 1 
27 2016 -0.153 27.206 0.571  0.3  1 1 
28 2014 
ROTI 
-0.236 28.393 0.552  0.3  1 0 
29 2015 -0.541 28.627 0.561  0.3  1 0 
30 2016 0.061 28.702 0.506  0.3  1 0 
31 2014 
SKBM 
0.065 27.200 0.511  0.3  0 1 
32 2015 0.041 27.362 0.550  0.3  0 1 
33 2016 -0.048 27.633 0.632  0.3  0 1 
34 2014 
SKLT 
-0.010 26.527 0.537  0.3  0 1 
35 2015 0.003 26.656 0.597  0.3  0 1 
36 2016 -0.675 27.066 0.479  0.3  0 1 
37 2014 
ULTJ 
0.084 28.702 0.224  0.3  0 1 
38 2015 -0.050 28.895 0.210  0.3  0 1 
39 2016 -0.036 29.075 0.177  0.3  0 1 
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Appendix 5. The Data of Company Size 
No Code Name 2014 
      Assets LN 
1 AISA Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food Tbk  Rp      7.371.846.000.000  29.6287 
2 ALTO Tri Banyan Tirta Tbk  Rp      1.239.053.626.858  27.8454 
3 CEKA Wilmar Cahaya Indonesia Tbk (d.h Cahaya Kalbar Tbk)  Rp      1.284.150.037.341  27.8811 
4 DLTA   Delta Djakarta Tbk  Rp         991.947.134.000  27.6229 
5 ICBP Indofood CBP Sukses Makmur Tbk  Rp    24.910.211.000.000  30.8463 
6 INDF Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk  Rp    85.938.885.000.000  32.0847 
7 MLBI Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk  Rp      2.231.051.000.000  28.4335 
8 MYOR Mayora Indah Tbk  Rp    10.291.108.029.334  29.9623 
9 PSDN Prashida Aneka Niaga Tbk  Rp         620.929.000.000  27.1545 
10 ROTI Nippon Indosari Corporindo Tbk  Rp      2.142.894.276.216  28.3932 
11 SKBM Sekar Bumi Tbk  Rp         649.534.031.113  27.1995 
12 SKLT Sekar Laut Tbk  Rp         331.574.891.637  26.5271 
13 ULTJ Ultrajaya Milk Industry and Trading Company Tbk  Rp      2.917.083.567.355  28.7016 
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2015 2016 
Assets LN Assets LN 
 Rp     9.060.979.000.000  29.8350  Rp    9.254.539.000.000  29.8561 
 Rp     1.180.228.072.164  27.7967  Rp    1.165.093.632.823  27.7838 
 Rp     1.485.826.210.015  28.0270  Rp    1.425.964.152.418  27.9859 
 Rp     1.038.321.916.000  27.6686  Rp    1.197.796.650.000  27.8115 
 Rp   26.560.624.000.000  30.9105  Rp  28.901.948.000.000  30.9949 
 Rp   91.831.526.000.000  32.1510  Rp  82.174.515.000.000  32.0399 
 Rp     2.100.853.000.000  28.3734  Rp    2.275.038.000.000  28.4530 
 Rp   11.342.715.686.221  30.0596  Rp  12.922.421.859.142  30.1900 
 Rp        620.399.000.000  27.1536  Rp       653.797.000.000  27.2061 
 Rp     2.706.323.637.034  28.6266  Rp    2.919.640.858.718  28.7025 
 Rp        764.484.248.710  27.3625  Rp    1.001.657.012.004  27.6327 
 Rp        377.110.748.359  26.6558  Rp       568.239.939.951  27.0658 
 Rp     3.539.995.910.248  28.8951  Rp    4.239.199.641.365  29.0754 
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Appendix 6. The Data of Leverage 
No 
 
 
Code 
 
 
Name 
 
 
   2014 
Total Liabilities Total Asset Leverage 
1 AISA Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food Tbk  Rp    3.799.017.000.000   Rp    7.371.846.000.000  0.515 
2 ALTO Tri Banyan Tirta Tbk  Rp       706.402.717.818   Rp    1.239.053.626.858  0.570 
3 CEKA 
Wilmar Cahaya Indonesia Tbk (d.h 
Cahaya Kalbar Tbk) 
 Rp       746.598.865.219   Rp    1.284.150.037.341  
0.581 
4 DLTA   Delta Djakarta Tbk  Rp       227.473.881.000   Rp       991.947.134.000  0.229 
5 ICBP Indofood CBP Sukses Makmur Tbk  Rp  10.401.125.000.000   Rp  24.910.211.000.000  0.418 
6 INDF Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk  Rp  44.710.509.000.000   Rp  85.938.885.000.000  0.520 
7 MLBI Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk  Rp    1.677.254.000.000   Rp    2.231.051.000.000  0.752 
8 MYOR Mayora Indah Tbk  Rp    6.190.553.036.545   Rp  10.291.108.029.334  0.602 
9 PSDN Prashida Aneka Niaga Tbk  Rp       242.354.000.000   Rp       620.929.000.000  0.390 
10 ROTI Nippon Indosari Corporindo Tbk  Rp    1.182.771.921.472   Rp    2.142.894.276.216  0.552 
11 SKBM Sekar Bumi Tbk  Rp       331.624.254.750   Rp       649.534.031.113  0.511 
12 SKLT Sekar Laut Tbk  Rp       178.206.785.017   Rp       331.574.891.637  0.537 
13 ULTJ 
Ultrajaya Milk Industry and Trading 
Company Tbk 
Rp       651.985.807.625 Rp    2.917.083.567.355 0.224 
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2015 2016 
Total Liabilities Total Asset Leverage Total Liabilities Total Asset Leverage 
 Rp     5.094.072.000.000   Rp     9.060.979.000.000  0.562  Rp      4.990.139.000.000   Rp     9.254.539.000.000  0.539 
 Rp        673.255.888.637   Rp     1.180.228.072.164  0.570  Rp         684.252.214.422   Rp     1.165.093.632.823  0.587 
 Rp        845.932.695.663   Rp     1.485.826.210.015  0.569  Rp         538.044.038.690   Rp     1.425.964.152.418  0.377 
 Rp        188.700.435.000   Rp     1.038.321.916.000  0.182  Rp         185.422.642.000   Rp     1.197.796.650.000  0.155 
 Rp   10.173.713.000.000   Rp   26.560.624.000.000  0.383  Rp    10.401.125.000.000   Rp   28.901.948.000.000  0.360 
 Rp   48.709.933.000.000   Rp   91.831.526.000.000  0.530  Rp    38.233.092.000.000   Rp   82.174.515.000.000  0.465 
 Rp     1.334.373.000.000   Rp     2.100.853.000.000  0.635  Rp      1.454.398.000.000   Rp     2.275.038.000.000  0.639 
 Rp     6.148.225.759.034   Rp   11.342.715.686.221  0.542  Rp      6.657.165.872.077   Rp   12.922.421.859.142  0.515 
 Rp        296.080.000.000   Rp        620.399.000.000  0.477  Rp         373.512.000.000   Rp        653.797.000.000  0.571 
 Rp     1.517.788.685.162   Rp     2.706.323.637.034  0.561  Rp      1.476.889.086.692   Rp     2.919.640.858.718  0.506 
 Rp        420.396.809.051   Rp        764.484.248.710  0.550  Rp         633.267.725.358   Rp     1.001.657.012.004  0.632 
 Rp        225.066.080.248   Rp        377.110.748.359  0.597  Rp         272.088.644.079   Rp        568.239.939.951  0.479 
 Rp        742.490.216.326   Rp     3.539.995.910.248  0.210  Rp         749.966.146.582   Rp     4.239.199.641.365  0.177 
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Appendix 7. The Data of Independent Boards of Commissioner 
No Code Name         
      2014 
   
President 
Commissioner 
Commissioner 
Independent 
Boards of 
Commissioners 
Persentage 
1 AISA Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food Tbk 
Anton Apriyantono 
Hengky 
Koestanto 
Bondan Haryo 
Winarno 
20% 
Kang Hongkie 
Widjaja 
Ridha DM 
Wirakusumah 
 
2 ALTO Tri Banyan Tirta Tbk Agung Salim Marlen 
Sunotoredjo 
Andy Wardhana 
Putra 
Tanumihardja 33% 
3 CEKA 
Wilmar Cahaya Indonesia Tbk (d.h 
Cahaya Kalbar Tbk) 
Hendri Saksti 
Ricky 
Hermanto 
Hendardji 
Soepandji 33% 
4 DLTA   Delta Djakarta Tbk 
Heru Budi Hartono 
Carlos Antonio 
Mayo Berba Ongky Sukasah 
40% 
 Takeshi Wada 
Reynato Serrano 
Puno 
5 ICBP Indofood CBP Sukses Makmur Tbk 
Benny Setiawan 
Santoso 
Franciscus 
Welirang 
Florentinus 
Gregorius 
Winarno 43% 
 Moleonoto 
Adi Pranoto 
Leman 
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Alamsyah Wahjudi Prakarsa 
6 INDF Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk 
Manuel V. Pangilinan 
Benny 
Setiawan 
Santoso Utomo Josodirdjo 
38%  
Edward A. 
Tortorici 
Torstein 
Stephansen 
 
Robert Charles 
Nicholson Hans Kartikahadi 
 
Graham L. 
Pickles 
 
7 MLBI Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk 
Cosmas Batubara 
Bobby Henry 
Noya Subarto Zaini 
38% 
 Michiel Egeler 
Martiono 
Hadianto 
 
Theodorus 
Antonius 
Fredericus de 
Rond Sumantri Slamet 
 
Roland Pirmez 
 
8 MYOR 
Mayora Indah Tbk Jogi Hendra Atmadja 
Hermawan 
Lesmana Ramli Setiawan 
40% 
  
 
Gunawan 
Atmadja 
Suryanto 
Gunawan 
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9 PSDN 
Prashida Aneka Niaga Tbk Mansjur Tandiono Made Sudharta Fery Yennoto 
33% 
  Widyono Lianto 
Agus 
Soegiarto 
Robertus 
Sukamto 
10 ROTI Nippon Indosari Corporindo Tbk 
Benny Setiawan 
Santoso Tan Hang Huat 
Seah Kheng Hong 
Conrad 33% 
11 SKBM Sekar Bumi Tbk Loddy Gunadi 
Agus Sandi 
Surya Juliher Marbun 33% 
12 SKLT Sekar Laut Tbk Loddy Gunadi 
Tjahjono 
Haryono 
Bing Hartono 
Poernomosidi 33% 
13 ULTJ 
Ultrajaya Milk Industry and Trading 
Company Tbk 
Supiandi 
Prawirawidjaja 
H. Soeharsono 
Sagir Endang Suharya 33% 
 
              
 2015 2016 
President 
Commissioner 
Commissioner 
Independent 
Boards of 
Commissione
rs 
Persentage 
President 
Commissioner 
Commissioner 
Independent 
Boards of 
Commissioner
s 
Persentage 
Anton 
Apriyantono 
Hengky 
Koestanto 
Bondan 
Haryo 
Winarno 20% 
Anton 
Apriyantono 
Hengky 
Koestanto 
Bondan Haryo 
Winarno 20% 
Kang Hongkie 
Widjaja (wakil) 
Ridha DM 
Wirakusumah 
 
Kang Hongkie 
Widjaja (wakil) Jaka Prasetya 
 
 111 
 
Agung Salim 
Marlen 
Sunotoredjo 
Andy 
Wardhana 
Putra 
Tanumihardja 33% 
Agung Salim 
Marlen 
Sunotoredjo 
Andy 
Wardhana 
Putra 
Tanumihardja 33% 
Hendri Saksti 
Ricky 
Hermanto 
Hendardji 
Soepandji 33% 
Hendri Saksti 
Ricky 
Hermanto 
Hendardji 
Soepandji 33% 
Heru Budi 
Hartono 
Carlos 
Antonio Mayo 
Berba 
Jeje 
Nurjaman 40% 
Michael Rolandi 
C. Brata 
Carlos Antonio 
Mayo Berba Jeje Nurjaman 40% 
 
Takeshi Wada 
Reynato 
Serrano Puno 
 
Takeshi Wada 
Reynato 
Serrano Puno 
Franciscus 
Welirang Moleonoto 
Hans 
Kartikahadi 
33% 
Franciscus 
Welirang Moleonoto 
Hans 
Kartikahadi 
33% 
 
Alamsyah 
Wahjudi 
Prakarsa 
 
Alamsyah 
A. 
Prijohandojo 
Kristanto 
 
Florentinus 
Gregorius 
Winarno 
  
Florentinus 
Gregorius 
Winarno 
 
Manuel V. 
Pangilinan 
Benny 
Setiawan 
Santoso 
Utomo 
Josodirdjo 38% 
Manuel V. 
Pangilinan 
Benny 
Setiawan 
Santoso 
Utomo 
Josodirdjo 38% 
 
Edward A. 
Tortorici 
Bambang 
Subianto 
 
Edward A. 
Tortorici 
Bambang 
Subianto 
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Robert 
Charles 
Nicholson 
Adi Pranoto 
Leman 
 
Robert Charles 
Nicholson 
Adi Pranoto 
Leman 
 
Graham L. 
Pickles 
  
Christopher 
Huxley Young 
 Cosmas 
Batubara 
Frans Erik 
Eusman 
Sumantri 
Slamet 
43% 
Cosmas Batubara 
Frans Erik 
Eusman 
Sumantri 
Slamet 
43% 
 
Theodorus 
Antonius 
Fredericus de 
Rond 
Bobby Henry 
Noya 
 
Henricus 
Petrus Van 
Zon 
Bobby Henry 
Noya 
 
Jasper 
Christiaan 
Hamaker 
Wahyu 
Hidayat 
 
Jasper 
Christiaan 
Hamaker 
Wahyu 
Hidayat 
      Jogi Hendra 
Atmadja 
Hermawan 
Lesmana 
Ramli 
Setiawan 
38% 
Jogi Hendra 
Atmadja 
Hermawan 
Lesmana 
Ramli 
Setiawan 
38% 
 
Gunawan 
Atmadja 
Suryanto 
Gunawan  
Gunawan 
Atmadja 
Suryanto 
Gunawan 
Mansjur 
Tandiono 
Made 
Sudharta Fery Yennoto 
33% 
Mansjur 
Tandiono Made Sudharta Fery Yennoto 
33% 
Widyono 
Lianto 
Agus 
Soegiarto 
Robertus 
Sukamto 
Widyono Lianto 
Agus 
Soegiarto 
Robertus 
Sukamto 
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Benny 
Setiawan 
Santoso 
Tan Hang 
Huat 
Jusuf 
Arbianto 
Tjondrolukito 33% 
Benny Setiawan 
Santoso 
Tan Hang Huat Jusuf Arbianto 
Tjondrolukito 33% 
Loddy Gunadi 
Agus Sandi 
Surya 
Juliher 
Marbun 33% Finna Huang 
Agus Sandi 
Surya Juliher Marbun 33% 
Loddy Gunadi 
Tjahjono 
Haryono 
Bing Hartono 
Poernomosidi 33% 
Loddy Gunadi 
Harry Fong 
Jaya 
Bing Hartono 
Poernomosidi 33% 
Supiandi 
Prawirawidjaja 
H. Soeharsono 
Sagir 
Endang 
Suharya 33% 
Supiandi 
Prawirawidjaja 
H. Soeharsono 
Sagir 
Endang 
Suharya 33% 
 
Appendix 8. The Data of Audit Quality 
No Code 
Name IPO Auditor 
Audit Quality 
    0 1 (Big Four) 
1 AISA Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food Tbk 11-Jun-97 RSM (Rhodes Salustro Mcgladley) Indonesia  0   
2 ALTO Tri Banyan Tirta Tbk 10-Jul-12 
Parker Randall 2015, Mgi Gar 2016 (Gideon 
Adi & Rekan) 0 
  
3 CEKA 
Wilmar Cahaya Indonesia Tbk (d.h 
Cahaya Kalbar Tbk) 
09-Jul-96 EY (Ernst and Young) 
  
1 
4 DLTA   Delta Djakarta Tbk 12-Feb-84 Deloitte   1 
5 ICBP Indofood CBP Sukses Makmur Tbk 07-Okt-10 EY (Ernst and Young)   1 
6 INDF Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk 14-Jul-94 EY (Ernst and Young)   1 
7 MLBI Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk 17-Jan-94 
KPMG ( Klynveld Peat Marwick Goeldner) 
2014, Deloitte 2015-2016   
1 
8 MYOR Mayora Indah Tbk 04-Jul-90 Moore Stephens 0   
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9 PSDN Prashida Aneka Niaga Tbk 18-Okt-94 EY (Ernst and Young)   1 
10 ROTI Nippon Indosari Corporindo Tbk 28-Jun-10 EY (Ernst and Young)   1 
11 SKBM Sekar Bumi Tbk 
5-Jan-93 
(relisting 
28-Sep-12) 
RSM (Rhodes Salustro Mcgladley) 0 
 
12 SKLT Sekar Laut Tbk 08-Sep-93 PKF( Pannel Kerr Forster) 0   
13 ULTJ 
Ultrajaya Milk Industry and Trading 
Company Tbk 
02-Jul-90 BDO (Binder Dijker Otte) 
0 
  
 
Appendix 9. The Data of  Managerial Ownership 
No 
 
 
Code 
 
 
Name 
 Managerial Ownership 
2014 2015 2016 
The Name 
of 
Ownership  
Dummy 
Variabel 
The Name 
of 
Ownership 
Dummy 
Variabel 
The Name 
of 
Ownership 
Dummy 
Variabel 
        
0 
(No) 
1 
(Yes)  
0 
(No) 
1 
(Yes)  
0 
(No) 
1 (Yes) 
1 AISA 
Tiga Pilar Sejahtera 
Food Tbk   
0 
    0 
  
  
0 
  
2 ALTO 
Tri Banyan Tirta 
Tbk 
Agus Salim 
  1     
1 
  
  
1 
3 CEKA 
Wilmar Cahaya 
Indonesia Tbk (d.h 
Cahaya Kalbar Tbk) 
Teh Kenny 
Suryadi 
  1   0 
  Hendry 
Saksti  
  
1 
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4 DLTA   Delta Djakarta Tbk   0     0     0   
5 ICBP 
Indofood CBP 
Sukses Makmur Tbk 
  
0     0 
  
  
0 
  
6 INDF 
Indofood Sukses 
Makmur Tbk 
Anthoni 
Salim, 
Fransiscus 
Welirang, 
Taufik 
Wiraatmaja 
  
1 
Anthoni 
Salim, 
Fransiscus 
Welirang, 
Taufik 
Wiraatmaja  
  
1 
Anthoni 
Salim, 
Fransiscus 
Welirang, 
Taufik 
Wiraatmaja 
  1 
7 MLBI 
Multi Bintang 
Indonesia Tbk 
  
0     0 
  
  
0 
  
8 MYOR Mayora Indah Tbk   
0     0 
  
Jogi Hendra 
Atmadja 
  
1 
9 PSDN 
Prashida Aneka 
Niaga Tbk 
Agus 
Soegiarto 
and 
Widyono 
Lianto   
1 
Agus 
Soegiarto  
  
1 
Agus 
Soegiarto 
  1 
10 ROTI 
Nippon Indosari 
Corporindo Tbk 
  
0     0 
  
  
0 
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11 SKBM Sekar Bumi Tbk 
Loddy 
Gunadi, 
Harry 
Lukmito, 
Freddy 
Adam, Inge 
Indriana 
Satyawan, 
Gary 
Iyawan, 
Pahlawan 
Hari 
Tjahjono   
1 
Harry 
Lukmito, 
Freddy 
Adam, 
Gary 
Iyawan, 
Loddy 
Gunadi, 
Inge 
Indriana 
Satyawan 
  
1 
Loddy 
Gunadi, 
Harry 
Lukmito, 
Freddy 
Adam, Inge 
Indriana 
Satyawan, 
Gary 
Iyawan, 
Pahlawan 
Hari 
Tjahjono 
  1 
12 SKLT Sekar Laut Tbk 
Harry 
Sunogo, 
Loddy 
Gunadi 
  
1 
Welly 
Gunawan, 
Harry 
Sunogo, 
Loddy 
Gunadi 
 
1 
Welly 
Gunawan, 
Harry 
Sunogo, 
Loddy 
Gunadi, 
Harry Fong 
Jaya 
  1 
13 ULTJ 
Ultrajaya Milk 
Industry and Trading 
Company Tbk 
Samudera 
Prawirawidj
aja   
1 
Samudera 
Prawirawid
jaja   
1 
Samudera 
Prawirawidj
aja 
  1 
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Appendix 10. The Calculation of Earnings Management 
a. The Calculation of Earnings Management on 2014 
         No Code NI CF TAC TAt-i TACt/TAt-i 1/TAt-i Del REVt 
1 AISA 3.78142E+11 3.5353E+11 24612000000 5.02582E+12 0.004897107 1.98972E-13 1.08324E+12 
2 ALTO 10135298976 -30575376304 40710675280 1.50252E+12 0.027094942 6.65549E-13 -1.54798E+11 
3 CEKA 39026238204 -1.47807E+11 1.86833E+11 1.06963E+12 0.1746713 9.34905E-13 1.16999E+12 
4 DLTA   2.88073E+11 1.64247E+11 1.23827E+11 8.67041E+11 0.142815216 1.15335E-12 12186841000 
5 ICBP 2.53168E+12 3.86084E+12 -1.32916E+12 2.12675E+13 -0.06249742 4.70202E-14 4.92778E+12 
6 INDF 5.14632E+12 9.26932E+12 -4.123E+12 7.76114E+13 -0.053123564 1.28847E-14 7.9708E+12 
7 MLBI 7.94883E+11 9.13005E+11 -1.18122E+11 1.78215E+12 -0.06628069 5.61121E-13 2.9885E+12 
8 MYOR 4.09825E+11 -8.62339E+11 1.27216E+12 9.71022E+12 0.131012861 1.02984E-13 1.41691E+13 
9 PSDN -28175252332 21202281251 -49377533583 6.81832E+11 -0.07241888 1.46664E-12 -3.04472E+11 
10 ROTI 1.88578E+11 3.64976E+11 -1.76398E+11 1.82269E+12 -0.096779041 5.4864E-13 3.74743E+11 
11 SKBM 89115994107 48342031990 40773962117 4.97653E+11 0.081932588 2.00943E-12 1.84147E+11 
12 SKLT 16480714984 23398218902 -6917503918 3.01989E+11 -0.022906439 3.31137E-12 1.14371E+11 
13 ULTJ 2.83361E+11 1.28023E+11 1.55338E+11 2.81162E+12 0.055248654 3.55667E-13 4.56558E+11 
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DEL 
REVt/TAt-i PPE PPE / TAt-i Beta 1 Beta 2 Beta 3 Del RECt 
(Del REVt - Del 
RECt) / Tat-i NDA DA 
0.216 
1.78569E+12 0.355 -0.030 0.031 -0.032 4.394E+11 0.128 -0.007 0.012 
-0.103 5.02483E+11 0.334 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 -7.448E+10 -0.053 0.001 0.026 
1.094 2.2156E+11 0.207 -0.029 -1.225 0.257 3.12E+10 1.065 -1.251 1.426 
0.014 1.13596E+11 0.131 0.459 0.335 -0.677 -1.2E+11 0.148 -0.039 0.182 
0.232 5.83884E+12 0.275 0.198 -0.035 0.071 2.41E+11 0.220 0.012 -0.074 
0.103 2.20115E+13 0.284 -0.259 -0.024 -0.001 -1.2E+12 0.118 -0.003 -0.050 
1.677 1.31531E+12 0.738 0.093 0.480 0.220 5.62E+10 1.645 0.951 -1.018 
1.459 3.58501E+12 0.369 0.344 -0.019 0.016 2.5E+11 1.433 -0.021 0.152 
-0.447 2.94075E+11 0.431 -0.557 -0.070 0.085 1.73E+10 -0.472 0.070 -0.142 
0.206 1.67998E+12 0.922 -0.042 -0.078 0.167 3.06E+10 0.189 0.140 -0.236 
0.370 2.50714E+11 0.504 0.242 -0.069 0.092 -2.9E+10 0.428 0.017 0.065 
0.379 1.35211E+11 0.448 -0.593 -0.285 0.196 7.43E+09 0.354 -0.013 -0.010 
0162 1.00323E+12 0.357 0.034 0.154 -0.147 2.66E+10 0.153 -0.029 0.084 
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b. The Calculation of Earnings Management on 2015 
         No Code NI CF TAC TAt-i TACt/TAt-i 1/TAt-i Del REVt 
1 AISA 3,7375E+11 3,99185E+11 -25435000000 7,37387E+12 -0,003449343 0,0000000000001 8,71E+11 
2 ALTO -24345726797 -11384467878 -12961258919 1,23905E+12 -0,010460612 0,0000000000008 -3,1E+10 
3 CEKA 1,06549E+11 1,68614E+11 -62064923254 1,09416E+11 -0,567238177 0,0000000000091 -2,2E+11 
4 DLTA   1,92045E+11 2,46625E+11 -54580215000 9,97443E+11 -0,054720125 0,0000000000010 -1,8E+11 
5 ICBP 2,92315E+12 3,48553E+12 -5,62385E+11 2,49102E+13 -0,022576485 0,000000000000040 1,72E+12 
6 INDF 3,7095E+12 4,21361E+12 -5,04112E+11 8,60773E+13 -0,005856507 0,00000000000001 4,67E+11 
7 MLBI 4,96909E+11 9,19232E+11 -4,22323E+11 2,23105E+12 -0,189293297 0,0000000000004 2,7E+12 
8 MYOR 1,25023E+12 2,33679E+12 -1,08655E+12 1,0298E+13 -0,105511039 0,0000000000001 6,5E+11 
9 PSDN -42619829577 -22726926832 -19892902745 6,22508E+11 -0,031956044 0,0000000000016 -5,5E+10 
10 ROTI 2,70539E+11 5,55512E+11 -2,84973E+11 2,14289E+12 -0,132985161 0,0000000000005 2,94E+11 
11 SKBM 40150568621 62469996482 -22319427861 6,52977E+11 -0,034181058 0,0000000000015 -1,2E+11 
12 SKLT 20066791849 29666923359 -9600131510 3,36932E+11 -0,028492758 0,0000000000030 6,37E+10 
13 ULTJ 5,231E+11 6,69463E+11 -1,46363E+11 2,91813E+12 -0,050156403 0,0000000000003 4,77E+11 
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DEL 
REVt/TAt-
i PPE PPE / TAt-i Beta 1 Beta 2 Beta 3 Del RECt 
(Del REVt - Del 
RECt) / Tat-1 NDA DA 
0.118 2.29041E+12 0.311 
-0.049 -0.024 -0.029 
6.345E+11 
0.032 -0.010 0.006 
-0.025 5.83094E+11 0.471 
0.149 -0.039 -0.120 
-1.3E+10 
-0.014 -0.056 0.046 
-1.975 2.21003E+11 2.020 
0.652 3.489 -5.484 
-5.49E+10 
-1.474 -16.220 15.653 
-0.180 1.05314E+11 0.106 
-1.274 1.403 2.119 
-6.6E+10 
-0.114 0.064 -0.119 
0.069 6.55566E+12 0.263 
0.045 0.017 0.006 
4.879E+11 
0.049 0.002 -0.025 
0.005 2.50963E+13 0.292 
-0.416 -0.112 0.039 
7.007E+11 
-0.003 0.012 -0.018 
1.209 1.26607E+12 0.567 
-0.120 -4.660 -3.115 
-1.72E+11 
1.286 -7.759 7.570 
0.063 3.7707E+12 0.366 
0.242 0.071 0.019 
3.221E+11 
0.032 0.009 -0.115 
-0.088 2.87328E+11 0.462 
0.151 -0.042 -0.111 
-4.31E+10 
-0.019 -0.051 0.019 
0.137 1.82138E+12 0.850 
-0.127 0.360 0.429 
3.537E+10 
0.121 0.408 -0.541 
-0.182 3.93331E+11 0.602 
0.285 -0.064 -0.141 
-1.48E+10 
-0.159 -0.075 0.041 
0.189 1.48557E+11 0.441 
0.223 0.045 -0.088 
7.349E+09 
0.167 -0.031 0.003 
0.164 1.16071E+12 0.398 
0.000 0,000 0,000 
5,303E+10 
0.145 0.000 -0.050 
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c. The Calculation of Earnings Management on 2016 
No Code NI CF TAC TAt-i TACt/TAt-i 1/TAt-i Del REVt 
1 AISA 7.19228E+11 4.6358E+11 2.55648E+11 9.06098E+12 0.02821417 1.10363E-13 5.3479E+11 
2 ALTO -26500565763 20444874139 -46945439902 1.18023E+12 -0.03977658 8.47294E-13 -5.31E+09 
3 CEKA 2.49697E+11 1.76087E+11 73609696264 1.48583E+12 0.04954126 6.73026E-13 6.2981E+11 
4 DLTA   2.54509E+11 2.59852E+11 -5342238000 1.03832E+12 -0.00514507 9.63092E-13 7.5461E+10 
5 ICBP 3.6313E+12 4.58496E+12 -9.53663E+11 2.65606E+13 -0.03590514 3.76497E-14 3.4466E+13 
6 INDF 5.26691E+12 7.1756E+12 -1.9087E+12 9.18315E+13 -0.02078477 1.08895E-14 6.675E+13 
7 MLBI 9.82129E+11 1.24847E+12 -2.6634E+11 2.10085E+12 -0.12677708 4.75997E-13 5.6699E+11 
8 MYOR 1.38868E+12 6.59314E+11 7.29362E+11 1.13427E+13 0.06430223 8.81623E-14 3.5312E+12 
9 PSDN -36662178272 24429296083 -61091474355 6.20399E+11 -0.09847129 1.61187E-12 4.7999E+10 
10 ROTI 2.79777E+11 4.14702E+11 -1.34925E+11 2.70632E+12 -0.04985548 3.69505E-13 3.4742E+11 
11 SKBM 22545456050 -33834235357 56379691407 7.64484E+11 0.07374866 1.30807E-12 1.3887E+11 
12 SKLT 20646121074 1641040298 19005080776 3.77111E+11 0.05039655 2.65174E-12 8.8743E+10 
13 ULTJ 7.09826E+11 7.79109E+11 -69283010094 3.54E+12 -0.01957149 2.82486E-13 2.9206E+11 
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DEL 
REVt/TAt-
i PPE PPE / TAt-i Beta 1 Beta 2 Beta 3 Del RECt 
(Del REVt - Del 
RECt) / Tat-1 NDA DA 
0.059 2.58724E+12 0.286 -0.254 -0.290 -0.058 4.15111E+11 0.013 -0.020 0.049 
-0.004 6.05274E+11 0.513 0.011 0.080 -0.036 48999791365 -0.046 -0.022 -0.018 
0.424 2.15976E+11 0.145 0.355 0.222 -0.410 22167295243 0.409 0.031 0.018 
0.073 96275498000 0.093 -0.139 0.029 0.269 118002000 0.073 0.027 -0.032 
1.298 7.11429E+12 0.268 -0.244 -1.024 0.059 5.23372E+11 1.278 -1.293 1.257 
0.727 2.57019E+13 0.280 0.046 0.006 -0.009 1.82755E+12 0.707 0.002 -0.023 
0.270 1.27802E+12 0.608 0.065 -0.042 -0.539 79809000000 0.232 -0.338 0.211 
0.311 3.85942E+12 0.340 -0.386 -0.252 0.018 6.7722E+11 0.252 -0.057 0.121 
0.077 2.8216E+11 0.455 -0.399 -0.020 0.118 64745242474 -0.027 0.054 -0.153 
0.128 1.84272E+12 0.681 0.099 0.074 -0.176 31709611469 0.117 -0.111 0.061 
0.182 4.36019E+11 0.570 0.294 0.135 0.191 63796665912 0.098 0.122 -0.048 
0.235 2.99674E+11 0.795 0.570 0.497 0.802 21769911666 0.178 0.725 -0.675 
0.083 1.04207E+12 0.294 0.030 0.064 0.040 14293659898 0.078 0.017 -0.036 
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Appendix 11. The Result of Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
EM 39 -1,0176 15,6532 ,605631 2,7800921 
SIZE 39 26,5271 32,1510 28,733172 1,5363777 
LEV 39 ,0002 ,7518 ,466872 ,1801127 
IBC 39 ,2000 ,4286 ,343053 ,0525989 
AQ 39 0 1 ,54 ,505 
MO 39 0 1 ,54 ,505 
Valid N (listwise) 39     
 
Appendix 12. The Result of Classic Assumption Test 
A. Normality Test 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Unstandardized Residual 
N 39 
Normal Parameters
a,b
 Mean ,0000000 
Std. Deviation 0.56759359 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,132 
Positive ,132 
Negative -,070 
Test Statistic ,132 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,087
c
 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
c. Lilliefors Significance Correction. 
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B. Multicollinearity Test 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1,425 2,202  ,647 ,522   
SIZE -,023 ,069 -,051 -,328 ,745 ,861 1,161 
AQ ,284 ,235 ,211 1,206 ,236 ,692 1,445 
MO -,360 ,227 -,267 -1,581 ,123 ,740 1,351 
LEV ,154 ,120 ,210 1,280 ,209 ,780 1,282 
IBC 3,497 1,492 ,393 2,344 ,025 ,749 1,336 
a. Dependent Variable: EM 
 
C. Autocorrelation Test 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 ,552
a
 ,304 ,199 ,60908 2,049 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IBC, SIZE, MO, LEV, AQ 
b. Dependent Variable: EM 
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D. Heterocedasticity Test 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) ,052 7,448  ,007 ,994 
SIZE -,102 ,241 -,071 -,422 ,676 
AQ -,208 ,839 -,048 -,248 ,806 
MO 
-1,471 ,772 -,337 
-
1,907 
,065 
LEV 2,509 2,025 ,205 1,239 ,224 
IBC -,448 7,593 -,011 -,059 ,953 
a. Dependent Variable: LNRES 
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Appendix 13. The Result of Hypothesis Test 
A. The First Hypothesis 
Variables Entered/Removed
a
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 SIZE
b
 . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: EM 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 ,083
a
 ,007 -,020 ,68725 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SIZE 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -2,058 2,088  -,985 ,331 
SIZE ,037 ,073 ,083 ,506 ,616 
a. Dependent Variable: EM 
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B. The Second Hypothesis 
Variables Entered/Removed
a
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 LEV
b
 . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: EM 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 ,030
a
 ,001 -,026 ,68931 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LEV 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -1,015 ,130  -7,793 ,000 
LEV -,022 ,120 -,030 -,184 ,855 
a. Dependent Variable: EM 
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C. The Third Hypothesis 
Variables Entered/Removed
a
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 IBC
b
 . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: EM 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 ,413
a
 ,171 ,148 ,62802 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IBC 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) ,726 ,634  1,145 ,260 
LGIBC 3,673 1,331 ,413 2,759 ,009 
a. Dependent Variable: EM 
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D. The Fourth Hypothesis  
Variables Entered/Removed
a
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 AQ
b
 . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: EM 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 ,402
a
 ,161 ,139 ,63151 
a. Predictors: (Constant), AQ 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -1,294 ,149  -8,691 ,000 
AQ ,541 ,203 ,402 2,669 ,011 
a. Dependent Variable: EM 
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E. The Fifth Hypothesis  
Variables Entered/Removed
a
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 MO
b
 . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: EM 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 ,254
a
 ,065 ,039 ,66698 
a. Predictors: (Constant), MO 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -,818 ,157  -5,202 ,000 
MO -,342 ,214 -,254 -1,598 ,119 
a. Dependent Variable: EM 
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F. The Sixth Hypothesis 
 
Variables Entered/Removed
a
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 IBC, SIZE, MO, LEV, AQ
b
 . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: EM 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 ,552
a
 ,304 ,199 ,60908 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IBC, SIZE, MO, LEV, AQ 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5,354 5 1,071 2,887 ,029
b
 
Residual 12,242 33 ,371   
Total 17,596 38    
a. Dependent Variable: EM 
b. Predictors: (Constant), IBC, SIZE, MO, LEV, AQ 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1,425 2,202  ,647 ,522 
MO -,360 ,227 -,267 -1,581 ,123 
SIZE -,023 ,069 -,051 -,328 ,745 
AQ ,284 ,235 ,211 1,206 ,236 
LEV ,154 ,120 ,210 1,280 ,209 
IBC 3,497 1,492 ,393 2,344 ,025 
a. Dependent Variable: EM 
 
 
 
